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ABSTRACT 
In 1977 New Zealand enacted the Contractual Law of Mistake and departed in this 
context from the traditional Common Law. 
The legislature decided not to codify the whole contract law, but only a part of it: the 
law of contractual mistakes. After more than 25 years this research paper will 
examine the experiences in New Zealand with such a codification and evaluate 
whether a partial codification can be recommended. For this purpose the aims and 
intentions of the Reform Committee will be examined and it will be shown where 
problems in the adjudication arose. 
The experiences that were made in New Zealand with a partial codification has 
recently gained even more importance, after the EWCA in the UK abolished the 
equitable doctrine of mistake and asked for a codification to achieve more flexibility 
in the law of mistake. 
This paper will show, that the Contractual Mistakes Act was only a half-hearted 
approach to codify the contract law and to achieve the aims set out by the Law 
Reform committee. 
The reason for this evaluation is, that the Act is in itself incoherent, because it offers 
the courts on the one hand a very wide scope in relation to the definition of mistake 
and possible remedies on the discretion-side and on the other hand constrains the 
possibility for the courts to grant relief by enacting the prerequisites in section 6 of the 
Act. 
Because of this half-heartedness the Act caused great problems for the judges to 
achieve a "just" result. This problem became apparent in the decision of Conlon v 
Ozolins were the Court of Appeal was forced to subsume a unilateral mistake, against 
the intention of the legislature, under the Act in order to achieve a "just" result. 
The Act took away from the judges the flexibility to achieve this "just result" under 
the traditional solution of Common Law and Equity. 
Eventually, the Act has shown that the only way to codify the law of mistake is to 
codify the whole contract law and not only extracts of it. The reason for this 
assessment is that the law of mistake is related to different parts of the Contract Law, 
like contract formation and rescission of contract. It is not possible to codify one part 
without the other or distraction will be caused. 
Instead of such a partial codification it is better to stay with the traditional Common 
Law/ Equity solution. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important principles in Contract Law is that agreements must be kept. 
On the other hand there might be circumstances in which it would be unjust to hold 
the parties to a bargain, arising from the fact that the parties have entered in 
consequence of mistake. Neither principle is paramount. 1 Therefore, the Law of 
Contractual Mistakes sets up rules, which regulates these two conflicting principles. 
In New Zealand the Law of Contractual Mistakes was purely a creation of the judge-
made Common Law and Equity until 1977. However, in recent years legislative 
change has been the most important influence on New Zealand contract law.2 A series 
of statutes reformed and replaced much of the Common Law in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s.3 In the field of Contract Law that were the Illegal Contracts Act 1970, the 
Contractual Mistake Act 1977, the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 and the Contracts 
(Privity) Act 1980. So, in 1977 the New Zealand Legislature departed from the 
Common Law and chose to enact mistakes in the Contractual Mistakes Act.4 .5 An 
interesting question that occurs, in this situation, is whether the old Common Law 
rules6 are abolished or whether they still exist beside the Act. The result seems to be 
clear: Statute law is made by Parliament. Its legislation cannot - because of the 
supremacy of Parliament- be declared invalid by the Courts. So, the legislation 
prevails over all other types of law7 and hence also prevails over the Common Law. 
This apparently clear result does not consider the intention of the Parliament, which is 
an important factor for construing a code. Sometimes the intention of the legislation is 
not to abolish the Common Law in a particular area completely. This is only the 
intention of the Parliament in cases where the act is a code. In this case the Common 
Law in a particular area is replaced with a set of statutory rules that are the exhaustive 
1 Richard Sutton "Keeping it simple: New Zealand's Code of Contractual Mistake" in EJH 
Schrage(ed.) Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contract 381, 386. 
2 John F Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd S Law of Contract in New 'Zealand (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 9. 
3 John F Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd S Law of Contract in New 'Zealand (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 9. 
4 In the following : "the Act". 
5 John F Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd S Law of Contract in New 'Zealand (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 287. 
6 (on which the statute is virtually build) 
7 John F Bun-ows Statute Law in New 'Zealand (3 ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2003) 13. 
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and exclusive source of the law. 8 Only if this had occurred, then the Common Law 
rules regarding mistakes would have been abolished totally. Although pursuant to the 
title of section 5 the Act is an "Act to be a Code", this question is still vividly debated 
after more than 25 years since the enactment. The adversaries of this debate are, on 
the one side, Professor McLauchlan who contents that the Common Law principles 
still have to be applied. On the other side Mr Dugdale (a former member of the 
Committee for the Act), Professor Sutton and Professor Coote, who all see the Act as 
a code and therefore as exclusive in terms of contracts which fails because of 
mistakes. At this point it should only be stated that the adversaries appear to have 
different understandings of what exactly a code is and that there is also no final 
conclusion, as to whether the Act is a code or not. Therefore, it can be questioned 
whether the aim of the Act, which was to define and simplify the law of contractual 
mistake, has been achieved. 9 So far the courts in New Zealand appear to regard the 
Act as a Code and try to subsume every possible case under the Act. 10 
This research paper will not focus on the question whether the Act is a Code or not, 
because all arguments relating to this question have been exchanged several times and 
explored in detail. That is why this research paper will take a different, maybe more 
practical approach: What are the experiences with a "codification" in a Common Law 
country? That this question has gained a lot of importance can be seen if we take a 
look at the recent developments in the United Kingdom: In the Great Peace the Court 
of Appeal abolished the equitable doctrine of common mistake. 11 Lord Philipps MR, 
who delivered the decision of the court, recognised that the "equitable jurisdiction to 
grant rescission on terms where a common fundamental mistake has induced a 
contract gives greater flexibility than a doctrine of common law which holds the 
contract void in such circumstances." 12 The aim of "greater flexibility" should no 
longer be achieved by the equitable doctrine but by a legislative intervention: 
"Just as the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 was needed to temper the 
effect of the common law doctrine of frustration, so there is scope for legislation to 
8 John F Burrows Statute Law in New Zealand (3 ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2003) 375. 
9 Richard Sutton "The Code of Contractual Mistake: What went wrong?"(2003) 9 NZBLQ 234,234. 
10 It will be shown later that these endeavours of the judges reveal a lot of the flaws in the Act. 
11 Andrew Phang "Controversy in common mistake" (2003) Conv & Prop Law 247,247. 
12 Great Peace Shipping l.Jd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd (The Great Peace) [2002) EWCA 
Civ 1407; [2003) QB 679 at [161). 
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give greater flexibility to our law of mistake than the common law allows." 13 In this 
context it will be questioned how this case would have been resolved in New Zealand 
and whether the legislative intervention gave greater flexibility than the Common 
Law. 
This research paper will argue that the Act was 14a half-hearted approach in many 
ways. It could therefore not be recommended to other Common Law countries as a 
"good example of statute law". This evaluation is based on different reasons, which 
will be identified in this research paper. Firstly, the legislature seems unable to know 
whether the courts should determine whether a case of remediable mistake is given or 
not. On the one hand the definition of mistake in the Act is extraordinary broad and 
general 15, so that the Courts have to determine when exactly a mistake is given. On 
the other hand the possible cases in which relief may be granted are strikingly 
narrow 16, so that the courts do not have much space to vary from these prerequisites. 
In this context one great problem of the Act will be revealed: 
In some cases, like cases of unilateral mistake and constructive knowledge, under the 
Act relief should not be available, but the only "just" solution, because of the 
"particular facts" of the case would be to grant relief. Because of this the courts were 
forced to transform these cases by verbal skill under the Act in order to achieve a 
"just" result. 
Prior to the Act the courts had in these cases the opportunity to grant relief under 
Equity. But this possibility to achieve a "just" result was also taken away from the 
court, because of the abolition of the equitable doctrine of mistake, which was a major 
aim of the act. The flexibility that is taken away from the courts with this abolition 
contrasts sharply with the new flexibility that was given to the courts on the discretion 
side with the enactment of more flexible remedies. Strikingly these flexible remedies 
could only come into force when the obstacles of the narrow prerequisites, which 
were imposed on the courts, are overcome. 
13 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd (The Great Peace) [2002] EWCA 
Civ 1407; [2003] QB 679 at [161]. 
14 (although it was in 1977 a quite progressive attempt) 
15 Pursuant section 2(1). Mistake means a mistake, whether of law or of fact. 
16 Pursuant section 6(1)(a)-(c). 
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Therefore, it will be concluded that the Act took a lot of flexibility away from the 
courts and imposed on them17 a "justice" problem. 
Eventually the major intention of the legislature of the "amalgamation of fragmented 
doctrines of mistakes into a single body of law" was only implemented in a half-
hearted way. This aim could not have been achieved by such a "partial Codification of 
the Contract Law", because the contractual law of mistake touches not only questions 
of the rescission of a contract but also principles of contract formation. Consequently, 
a "partial codification" which does not enact these principals of contract formation 
could not achieve this aim. 
Therefore, it will be appreciated that the New Zealand approach not to enact the 
Contract Law in one big Code, but to pass a number of "mini-codes" over the years 18 
dealing with aspects of the law of contracts, was not a successful approach. This paper 
will argue that either you stick to a pure Common Law solution or you codify the 
whole contract law in one code. Something in between can only result in a half-
hearted solution. To show that the Act was half-hearted the most important 
prerequisites of the Act and the intentions behind them will be examined. 
Furthermore, the named major intentions will be examined. It will be shown that 
those intentions were often only converted in a half-hearted way. 
II BACKGROUND 
The Act goes back to a report of the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform 
Committee in 1976, which worked under the aegis of the Justice Department. The 
Committee was made up with practising lawyers, legal academics and departmental 
officials. 19 
A Intentions of the Legislature 
According to the Justice Department and the Committee there were many different 
reasons for the Codification. First the Common Law Rules, which dealt with 
"mistakes" where said to be a "fragmented series of doctrines some of which are 
overtly announced as rules relating to mistake, and others of which are based upon 
17 (at least in some cases) 
18 
Richard Sutton "Keeping it simple: New Zealand 's Code of Contractual Mistake" in EJH Schrage 
(ed.) Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contract 381 , 383. 
19 
The committee consisted of: Mr C I Patterson (Chai.Iman), Mr BJ Cameron, Professor B Coote, Mr 
D F Dugdale, Professor E P Ellinger, Mr J R Fox, Mr JS Henry, Mr W Illes, Mr J H Wallace, Mr A E 
Wright (Secretary). 
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different concepts, such as "offer and acceptance to correspond".20 Therefore, the Act 
represented, according to the Minister of Justice Hon. David Thomson, "the first 
attempt in a Common Law country to codify what is readily acknowledged to be a 
highly complex and fragmented area of commercial law".21 Hence, one of the major 
aims of the Act was identified by the Commercial Law Reform Committee as "the 
amalgamation of the present fragmented doctrines, some based upon mistake some 
based upon different legal devices, into a single body of law dealing with "mistake": 22 
Furthermore, the old Common Law relied on "tests for mistakes that are inherently 
meaningless. 23 These tests would make it difficult for courts to explain their decisions 
rationally, or achieve consistency in similar cases.24 
A main reason for the codification was -according to the Committee- the existence of 
a "double standard" for mistake in English and New Zealand law. 25 On the one hand 
there is the mistake-standard laid down in cases decided under the Common Law, on 
the other hand there is the mistake-standard laid down in Equity. 
The operation of Common Law mistake is very narrowly confined26 : Both parties 
must make a fundamental mistake of fact. 27 Equity may give relief to a person who 
has made a mistake, which is not fundamental in the narrow Common Law sense. 28 
Furthermore, the traditional view has been that a mistake of law29 can only in Equity 
sometimes give ground for relief. 30 Eventually the contract is under a mistake in 
Common Law void. Contrary to this in Equity the contract is only voidable. 31 So there 
were cases in which the contract was valid under the Common Law, but voidable 
under the equitable doctrine of mistake. 
In the view of the Committee this means that statements made in relation to the 
Common Law-mistake were qualified or contradicted when the equitable mistake 
20 
Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 3. 
21 Hon David Thomson (20 May 1977) 410 NZPD 7. 
22 
Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department ofJustice, Wellington 1976, 10. 
23 Hon Jim McLay (29 July) 412 NZPD 1743. 
24 
Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 4. 
25 
Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 7. 
26 Chitty on Contracts(27 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994) 294. 
27 Gu enter Treitel The Law of Contract ( 11 th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003) 286. 
28 Guenter Treitel The Law of Contract (11 th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003) 312. 
29 
( opposed to one of fact) 
3° Chitty on Contracts(27 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994) 318. 
31 Chitty on Contracts(27 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994) 295. 
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rules were applied. 32 The Committee appreciated the distinction between mistake in 
Common Law and Equity as an unnecessary complexity and artificiality in the law of 
mistake.33 Furthermore, the equitable doctrine of mistake was "not altogether free 
from uncertainty".34 
Finally, one of the main reasons for the enactment was that the legal remedies 
available as a result of a mistake were "drastic and inflexible"35 , resulting basically in 
no contract.36 Therefore, the courts had been reluctant to commit themselves to a clear 
policy in defining mistake, thereby avoiding a substantial injustice to one party. 37 
Eventually, the overall aim of the Act was to define and simplify the law of mistake 
and to achieve judicial certainty. 
B Criticisms during the Codification 
It has to be clarified that the "codification" did not pass without criticism but 
criticised as being unnecessary. 38 
It was purported that, no one had asked for it because the present law at that point of 
time was contended to work well, because persons who make mistakes -the 
incompetent- were driven out of the business. 39 In contrast to this the new codification 
would in its result protect the incompetent businessmen, who made a mistake. 
Moreover, it would create uncertainty because nobody knew at that point what the 
Contractual Mistakes Bill mean, particularly what mistake means. The definition that 
mistake according to the Bill means a mistake whether of law or of fact40 actually 
means that "the Supreme Court will determine what is or is not a mistake under the 
Contractual Mistake Act".41 
32 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 7. 
33 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 7. 
34 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 7. 
35 Hon David Thomson (20 May 1977) 410 NZPD 7. 
36 Hon Jim McLay (29 July) 412 NZPD 1743. 
37 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 8. 
38 Hon Richard Prebble (8 September 1977) 413 NZPD 2805. 
39 Hon Richard Prebble (8 September 1977) 413 NZPD 2805: "The sooner the incompetent stops 
building the better". 
40 Hon Richard Prebble (8 November 1977) 415 NZPD 4288:''That is a great definition!" 
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III THE DIFFERENCES OF THE ACT IN COMPARISON TO THE OLD 
COMMONIAW 
After these controversies the Act was finally codified, but the criticism has not 
stopped ever since then. Now it will be examined whether this criticism is justified or 
whether the aims, which the Legislature had in mind by passing the Act were 
achieved. For this purpose the differences and similarities to the previous Common 
Law will be shown and what exactly the intention of the legislature was. The 
experiences with the new law will show that the Act was not the optimal way to 
achieve the aims, which were formulated by the Reform Committee. Therefore, 
criteria will be proposed which would have helped to achieve the objectives. 
A The Prerequisites for the Grant of Relief 
Relief under the Act can only be granted if the prerequisites of section 6(1) are 
satisfied. In any case under this section the parties have to be influenced by a mistake 
in entering into the contract. Furthermore, the result of this mistake must be that there 
is a substantial inequality of values and the applicant has to show that he is not 
obliged by the terms of the contract to shoulder any burden of risk42 . 
1 Mistake 
Obviously, the main term in a Act should be the term "mistake". In the Act is only 
stated that a "mistake means a mistake, whether of law or fact". 43 
Originally, the Committee proposed another more detailed definition.44 The proposal 
additionally stated that mistake included an erroneous opinion and calculation as well 
as an error in the manner in which a document is expressed. It furthermore stated that 
it does not include any matter of expectation, which concerns, or is dependent on, an 
event occurring or failing to occur after a particular contract is entered into. 45 
But this was believed to be a too wide definition and therefore the Statutes Revision 
Committee deleted these subsections.46 As a reason for the amendment it was 
purported that the provision originally proposed was entirely unnecessary, since47 the 
42 section(6)(b) and (c) 
43 section(2)(1) 
44 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 15. 
45 ibid. 
46 John F Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd Law of Contract in New Zealand (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 292. 
47 (contrary to the view of the Reform Committee) 
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purported that the provision originally proposed was entirely unnecessary, since47 the 
Common Law saw no difficulty in giving relief for errors about matters of opinion.48 
According to Hon Jim McLay MP the Committee deleted the reference to erroneous 
opinion, erroneous calculations, and errors in the manner in which a document is 
expressed, because it was concerned that such a definition of mistake "could lead to a 
much greater number of actions based on contractual mistakes than has previously 
been the case. "49 
The chosen definition in section 2 ( 1) of the Act is not what is expected from an 
approach of jurisdiction, because it is by far too general. It does not provide the 
answer for what a mistake is. To define what a mistake actually is, is left totally to the 
courts. For such a result a codification is not necessary. 
Certainly, a specific definition of what exactly a mistake is would also not be the right 
approach. In this case the Act would have been totally unworkable. The reason for 
this would be that the flexibility of the courts would be constricted because of the 
definition. The judges would have in the cases of such a very specific definition no 
chance to react on the special circumstances of the individual case to achieve a just 
result. Thus, neither a very specific definition nor a broad definition like in the Act 
can be recommended. At this point it is helpful to take a look at a civil law country, 
were a middle course has been enacted. In the German Civil Code (BGB) three 
different kinds of mistake are codified. Firstly, a person can challenge the contract if 
the person made a mistake about the subject matter of a declaration (where a person 
declares A and thinks that A means B)5°. Secondly, a challengeable mistake is given 
where the mistake is about the declaration itself (where a person declares A but 
wanted to declare B)5 1• Finally, a declaration can be challenged if his will is 
. d . 1 " . . . ,,52 53 commumcate maccurate y as an error m commumcat1on . 
Thus, here only basic cases of mistake have been codified by the legislature. But the 
codification is not so wide that it is absolutely unclear when a mistake is given or not. 
47 (contrary to the view of the Reform Committee) 
48 Donald J Lange "Statutory Reform of the Law of Mistake"(l 980) 80 Osg HL.J 429,437-440. 
49 Hon Jim McLay (8. September 1977) 413 NZPD 2804. 
50 § 119 I 1. Alt. BGB (Inhaltsirrtum) 
5 1 § 119 I 1. Alt. BGB (Erklaerungsirrtum) 
52 § 120 BGB (Uebermittlungsfehler) 
53 Gerhard Robbers An Introduction to German Law (3 ed, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2003) 214. 
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On the other hand54 there is still enough room for the judges within the scope of these 
cases to achieve a just result in the individual cases. 
(a) The intention behind the definition 
Although, section 2(1) does not provide a "real" substantial definition, this short 
sentence includes a big departure from the previous Common Law. 
At Common Law, the traditional view is that a mistake can affect the validity of a 
contract only if it is one of "fact" as opposed to one of "law". 55 The reason56 for this 
distinction was that everyone was presumed to know the law: ignorance of the law 
was neither excuse nor defence.57 But the distinction between these two categories 
was not always easy to draw or to justify.58 The problems that existed with this 
distinction should be avoided by the new broad definition, which treats mistakes of 
fact and of law equally. 
Apparently the Statutes Revision Committee59 wanted to leave it to the court to define 
whether a mistake is given or not. Therefore, this Act did not change anything in 
comparison to the Common Law, because the courts should be the one to define the 
mistakes. It seems like the Statute Revision Committee was afraid to define key 
elements into a statute and did not want to constrain the flexibility of the courts. 
As already stated above the Committee viewed the "drastic and inflexible legal 
remedies60, as the main reason why the courts were so reluctant to commit themselves 
to a clear policy in defining mistake. Thereby, the Courts tried to avoid a substantial 
injustice to one party. 61 Now with the new section 7 those flexible remedies were 
given and it appears that the Statutory Revision Committee expected that therefore the 
courts would commit themselves to a clear policy in defining mistake. That is why the 
Revision Committee held that "it would be unwise to extend the definition of mistake 
54 In contrast to a very specific definition of mistake. 
55 Guenter Treitel The Law of Contract (10 th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999) 288. 
56 (usually given) 
57 Gerald Henry Louis Fridman The Law of Contract in Canada (3rd ed Carswell Thomson, Ontario 
1994) 265. 
58 Guenter Treitel The Law of Contract (11 th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003) 313. 
59 ,by amending the original proposed definition of mistake, 
60 Hon David Thomson (20 May 1977) 410 NZPD 7. 
61 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 8. 
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beyond a fairly limited category at this early stage of development of a new category 
of legal remedies". 62 
(b) Experience with the new definition 
Therefore, it has to be questioned whether this expectation that the courts would now 
commit themselves to a clear policy in defining mistake has become real. This would 
only be true if in cases were it was uncertain whether a mistake was given or not, after 
the enactment this was clear. 
In this context only one example should be given that reveals that in a clear policy 
whether mistake is given is not recognisable. One well-known problem in the law of 
mistake is the question whether ignorance of a matter can be defined as a mistake or 
not. In New Zealand Refining Company Ltd v Attorney-General 63 both parties failed 
to consider whether a payment made pursuant to a contract was inclusive or exclusive 
of certain taxes. In this case the Court of Appeal decided that this did not amount to a 
mistake. Contrary to this decision was the judgment of the Court of Appeal two years 
earlier in Slater Wilmshurst Ltd. v Crown Group Custodian Ltd64 Here the parties 
were contracting for a building and both had forgotten that another party held a right 
of pre-emption over the property. 
Here it was held that the failure to think about this right could be regarded as a 
mistake. So, although in both cases the Court of Appeal was confronted with the same 
decisive question, the decisions of the court were conflicting. In the first case it was 
held that ignorance to a matter could not amount to a mistake. In the second the 
addressed question was answered in an affirmative way by the court. By this example 
it can be seen that it is doubtable whether the hope of the legislature that the courts 
would commit themselves to a clear policy of defining mistake65 would be achieved. 
This problem could have been avoided for example by a clarification in the Act that in 
cases of failure of consideration a mistake is given or not. 
( c) Assessment 
The enactment of the broad "declaration" that mistakes means mistake of fact and law 
was just a half-hearted approach: 
62 Hon Jim McLay (8 . September 1977) 413 NZPD 2804. 
63 New Zealand Refining Company Ltd v Attorney-General (1993)15 TC 10,038(CA). 
64 Slater Wilmshurst Ltd v Crown Group Custodian Ltd. [1990] 1 NZLR 518, 539 (HC) Gallen J. 
65 (because of the new flexible remedies) 
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On the one hand the legislature enacted an Act in order to abolish the "tests for 
mistakes that are inherently meaningless66 which made it difficult for courts to explain 
their decisions rationally, or achieve consistency in similar cases. 67 
On the other hand the definition of mistake, the key element of the Act, was not 
defined by the legislature itself, but left to the courts and therefore to the ones that 
were responsible for the development of the "inherently meaningless tests". Evidently 
it has to be doubted whether the legislature was serious with their aim to abolish these 
tests. 
With the enactment of a more substantial definition of mistake instead, the legislature 
could have created more effective guidelines, which were binding to the courts so that 
there would be no room for "inherently meaningless tests". As mentioned earlier that 
does not mean that the legislature should have enacted specific and detailed tests, but 
the legislature could have at least decided in the Act some of the well-known 
problems that existed in the Common Law68. This chance was missed, apparently 
because there was not very much confidence in a statutory mistake of law. This lack 
of confidence was expressed in the amendment of the Statute Revision Committee of 
the original proposal69, which was at least a more precise definition. Instead the 
definition of mistake was left to the court. This approach could have worked out, but 
here again the whole act was incoherent and therefore just a half-hearted approach. 
That is because the legislature lacked not only the confidence in a statutory law of 
mistake it also did not support a solution which enabled the courts to develop the law 
of mistake in a coherent way. Instead it was decided to enact specific prerequisites 70 
which had to be fulfilled in addition to a "mistake".71 The contrast between the wide 
definition of mistake on the one hand and these narrow cases is eye-catching and 
expresses the half-heartedness of the approach 
The result of this half-hearted approach was that the flexibility that was given to the 
judges on the one side by the enactment of the wide definition of mistake was not 
worth much, because of the very narrow prerequisites that were chosen in section 6. 
66 Hon Jim McLay (29. July 1977) 412 NZPD 1743. 
67 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 4. 
68 L"k . 1 e ignorance to a matter. 
69 By deleting the subsections (b) and (c) 
70 enacted in section 6 
71 although the mistake was not defined! 
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Eventually, the expectation that was expressed by the Statute Revision Committee, 
that the creation of the new flexible remedies in section 7 was sufficient for the courts 
to commit themselves to a clear policy in defining mistake appears to be very starry-
eyed and half-hearted. With the enactment of the narrow prerequisites 72 it was 
foreseeable that the courts would often have no opportunity to exercise their 
discretion and use the flexible remedies. Therefore, the development of a "clear policy 
of mistake" could have been only achieved if this development would have been left 
totally to the court, especially without the restriction of section 6. 
2 Knowledge according to section 6(1 )( a)(i) 
In section 6 (l)(a)(i) the only possibility is codified, where a unilateral mistake may 
grant relief under the Act. Pursuant to this section relief may be granted if "the 
mistake was known" to the not mistaken party. The knowledge of the other party is 
the reason why it is not a purely unilateral mistake and why relief can be granted in 
this case. 
But what exactly is "knowledge" in this context? Undoubtedly the case is contained 
when the not-mistaken party knows that the other party is acting on an erroneous 
belief. Questionable is whether cases of constructive knowledge also should be 
comprised. Constructive knowledge means that the not-mistaken party ought to have 
known that the other party is mistaken. 
(a) Intention for the enactment 
The Reform Committee intended that relief should not be available, "where the 
evidence falls short of establishing actual knowledge".73 The Committee stated that, 
"the law of contract is concerned with the enforcement of agreements independently 
of the question whether such agreements were prudently or imprudently made."74 The 
only exception from this principle is when "the other party knew of this mistake.75 
Therefore, the Legislation decided not to enact constructive knowledge. The Court of 
Appeal applied and confirmed this intention of the Legislation in Tri-Star Customs 
72 of section 6 
73 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 17. 
74 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 17. 
75 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 17. 
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and Forwarding Ltd v Denning76, by overruling the High Court decision that held that 
constructive knowledge suffices. 77 
(b) Discussion: A legal gap in the Act? 
In this context Professor McLauchlan raised the argument, that there is a legal gap in 
the Act in comparison to the old Common Law. In the situation of constructive 
knowledge no contract would have been formed under the old Common Law rule of 
Smith v Hughes (the objective principle). This old Common Law rule could be applied 
with the Act. Whether this objective rule is still applicable will be discussed in 
another context. Pursuant the objective principle of contract formation you are bound 
despite lack of intention, if you lead another person to reasonably believe in the terms 
you are offering. 78 According to Professor McLauchlan no contract would have been 
formed at Common Law if one party has constructive knowledge of the mistake: If 
one party ought to have known that the other party is mistaken he could not 
reasonably have believed in the offer of the mistaken party. 79 
It is questionable if the "legal gap" between the former Common Law and the Act 
really exists. This would only exist if the Common Law acknowledged that 
constructive know ledge prevents the formation of a contract. 
But it is not clear whether for the mistake to be operative it must be actually known to 
the other party or whether it is enough that it ought to have been apparent to any 
reasonable man. 80 Therefore, it can be doubted whether a legal gap between the 
Common Law and the Act really exists. 
76 Tri-Star Customs and Forwarding Ltd v Denning (1999) I NZLR 33 (CA). 
77 Denning v Tri-Star Customs and Forwarding Ltd (1996) 7 TCLR 256 ;17 NZTC 12,618(HC). 
78 Smith v Hughes [1871] LR 6 QB 597,607. 
79 D W MacLauchlan ''The Contractual Mistakes "Code": A Polite Response to Mr Dugdale" (2002) 
NZBLQ 132, 137. 
8° Chitty on Contracts(29 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) 409 
In Olympia Sauna Shippung Co SA v Shinwa Kaiim Kaisha Ltd (The Ypatia Halcoussi)[1985] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 364,371 QBD (Comm C) Bingham J argues that constructive knowledge is not enough:" ... He may 
even have thought that they had (been mistaken). But he cannot be shown to have had actual 
knowledge of their mistake, even if a mistake be assumed, the less so since the telexes represented no 
departure from anything which had previously been agreed or even assumed." 
In contrast to this decision it was held in McMaster University v Wilcher Construction Ltd (1971) 22 
DLR(3d) that constructive knowledge was sufficient. 
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Furthermore, there are good reasons why constructive knowledge should not prevent 
the formation of a contract. First you can argue it is an objective principle, so that the 
personal knowledge81 of the not-mistaken party is not decisive. Therefore, even if the 
other party ought to have known from the mistake, a contract can be formed. This is 
the case, because this other party should not have a duty to investigate whether the 
offer of the other party is flawless : 
"Each Party has to look after its own interests and neither owes a duty of care to the 
other. "82 Therefore constructive know ledge of one party of the mistake of the other 
party does not prevent the formation of a contract. 
Moreover, you can see by the comments of the Law Committee that it wanted to 
decide this question and achieve judicial security in this question by the deliberate 
omission of constructive knowledge. 83 A legal gap is therefore not given, because in 
New Zealand the debated question is decided in the code in a negative way. 
( c) Experience 
The legislature showed through the omission of the words "ought to have known" that 
constructive knowledge should not be enough for the grant of relief. So the legislature 
enacted a very narrow meaning of knowledge. 
Despite this there were tendencies in New Zealand to grant relief in such cases. A 
recent case in this context was Tri-Star Customs and Forwarding Ltd v Denning84: 
An agreement to lease conferred on the lessee (Tri- Star Customs) an option to 
purchase the premises for $720.000, with no mention of GST. The lessee, who had 
earlier proposed figures of $600.000 and $700.000, was induced to agree to this price 
when informed by its solicitor that the transaction was subject to GST and that he 
would be able to claim a refund of 80.000. When the lessee later purported to exercise 
the option, the Denning maintained that they understood GST would be added. 
Salmon J awarded Denning relief under the Act finding there was a qualifying 
unilateral mistake. 85 Though Tri-Star had no actual know ledge of the mistake it 
should have been aware of the existence of the mistake. Although the Court of Appeal 
8 1 (other than actual knowledge) 
82 Clarion Ltd v National Provident Institution (2000) 2 All ER 265, 281(HC). 
83 Brian Coote ' 'The Contractual Mistakes Act as a Code: Some Further Thoughts" (2002) 8 NZBLQ 
223,225. 
84 Tri-Star Customs and Forwarding Ltd v Denning (1999)1 NZLR 33(CA). 
85 Denning v Tri-Star Customs and Forwarding Ltd (1996) 7 TCLR 256;17 NZTC 12,618 (HC). 
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corrected this decision and held that actual know ledge was necessary, the High Court 
showed that the wordings of the Act are not unequivocal. In its ordinary meaning the 
word "known" connotes possession of information, or a state of awareness. 86 But the 
word "known" does not clarify how much information is necessary and what kind of 
state of awareness must be achieved. 
Another tendency in how the courts dealt with the enactment was that they construed 
a very wide understanding of actual knowledge. In King v Wilkinson87 the purchasers 
believed they were purchasing the property as fenced, but in reality that did not 
include a strip of land within the fence line 3.5 m wide extending along the entire 
southern boundary. Here Holland J held that the vendors "must have known" of the 
existence of the mistake because "it was only four years since the vendor had 
subdivided the property and knew that the fence was 3.5 m within the boundaries of 
the property" that he sold. 88 
In this case it seems like the court followed the intention of the legislature, but in 
reality it transformed by verbal skill a case of constructive knowledge into a case of 
actual know ledge. You can see this if you look at the formulation "must have known". 
This is a classical formulation of constructive knowledge89 and not actual knowledge. 
(d) Assessment 
The requirement of "knowledge" was also "codified" in a half-hearted way. Here you 
can reproach the legislature that they missed a chance to clarify that know ledge is 
actual knowledge. Although they must have known of the discussion that existed in 
the Common Law World, whether constructive knowledge is sufficient or not, a 
clarification was not enacted.90 Only the omission of the codification of the words 
"ought to have known" was not enough to clarify the intention of the legislature. 
The High Court-decision of Tri-Star also reveals that the Act seems to have in this 
context a "justice problem". 
86 Tri-Star Customs and Forwarding Ltd v Denning [1999] l NZLR 33,37(CA) Henry J. 
87 King v Wilkinson (1994) 2 NZ ConvC 828 (HC). 
88 King v Wilkinson [1994] 2 NZ ConvC 828,834 (HC) Holland J. 
89 ( · =ought to have known) 
90 Same reproach like in the case of ignorance of a matter, see above page 9. 
90 G L Lang ''The Contractual Mistake Act 1977"(1978) 4 Otago LR 245, 251. 
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This can be stated because there were not only endeavours in the legal science, but 
also in the jurisdiction of the courts (like in Tri-Star) to subsume constructive 
knowledge under the Act. So, it seems there might be cases in which this should be 
sufficient for the grant of relief as well. Apparently judges cannot grant relief in 
situations when it appears for them to be just to grant relief, because the prerequisites 
of the Act are not satisfied. Therefore, it seems like the Act took from the judges the 
flexibility to achieve a just result. 
This assumption is confirmed by the other tendency, which was shown in the wide 
application of actual knowledge in cases like King v Wilkinson. 91 In these cases it 
appears that the desire to grant relief led the judges to findings of actual knowledge 
where in fact there has only been constructive knowledge. 92 These tendencies reveal 
that the judges see the exclusion of constructive knowledge in some cases as not just 
and try to find a way to achieve the proper result. 
This is not surprising if you make yourself clear that the exclusion of constructive 
knowledge is contrary to the stated policy and purpose of the Act.93 The purpose of 
the Act is to mitigate the arbitrary effects of mistakes on contracts.94 But the party that 
has been mistaken will suffer the same harsh consequences regardless of whether or 
not the other party has know ledge of the mistake. 95 To grant relief in the one case and 
not in the other is to make an arbitrary distinction. 96 
Therefore, at this point a widening of the understanding of mistake should be 
recommended. A unilateral mistake should be remediable, independent whether 
knowledge of the non-mistaken party is given. This will be explained in detail in the 
next assessment of the next section. 
3 Enactment of unilateral mistakes in section 6( a)(iii)? 
In the law prior to the Act in general a contract was only void if both parties were 
mistaken. One major exception is when the other party knew of the mistake. A purely 
unilateral mistake, cases in which only one party was mistaken, was not sufficient. 
The reason for this narrow understanding of mistake is the judicial certainty. A party 
should be bound by what he said or wrote and cannot escape by simply saying that he 
91 King v Wilkinson (1994) 2 NZ ConvC 828(HC). 
92 G L Lang "The Contractual Mistake Act 1977"(1978) 4 Otago LR 245, 251. 
93 G L Lang "The Contractual Mistake Act 1977"(1978) 4 Otago LR 245, 251. 
94 G L Lang ''The Contractual Mistake Act 1977"(1978) 4 Otago LR 245, 251. 
95 G L Lang ''The Contractual Mistake Act 1977"(1978) 4 Otago LR 245, 251. 
96 G L Lang ''The Contractual Mistake Act 1977"(1978) 4 Otago LR 245, 251. 
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did not mean what the other reasonably understood, in the circumstances by the words 
used97 . 98 As it is essential for the formation of a contract that both parties agree about 
the conditions, the contract should only have the harsh consequence of being void if 
both parties share the mistake. 
(a) Intention 
Accordingly to this, different remediable kinds of mistakes were codified in section 6. 
Consequently, in subsection 6(1)(a)(i) the only remediable unilateral mistake is 
enacted. And even in the section (i) there is a relation to the other party, because the 
other party knows of the mistake. 
The Reform Committee stated in the Report: "Where only one of the parties has been 
mistaken, we do not think that relief should be available to him unless the evidence is 
sufficient to show that the other parties knew of his mistake. "99 Evidently the 
Committee intended that only in the case of a unilateral mistake pursuant section 
6(1)(a)(i) relief should be available. All other cases of unilateral mistake were 
intended not to be remediable. 
(b) Experience 
Against the intention of the Reform Committee the courts granted in some cases relief 
of unilateral mistake relief, without admitting that they were doing this. The crucial 
case in which this conduct became obvious is the famous Court of Appeal decision of 
Conlon v Ozolins. 
(i) Conlon v Ozalins100 
Mr Conlon, the plaintiff, intended to buy the four lots of land mentioned in a written 
agreement with Mrs Ozolins. Mrs Ozolins, an elderly widow (aged 73) who had some 
difficulty expressing her in the English language, only intended to sell three of those 
four sections because she wanted to keep the garden-section. Her solicitor has drawn 
up the written agreement. He had previously asked her what she intended to sell. She 
answered "not my home" which the solicitor understood to mean that Mr Conlon 
97 
( =objective principle) 
98 Chitty on Contracts(29 ed, Sweet & Maxwell , London, 2004) 401. 
99 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 17. 
10° Conlon v Ozolins (1984) 1 NZLR 489 (CA). 
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wanted to sell all lots. Mrs Ozolins was held to have been entirely unaware of her 
misapprehension. When Mrs Ozolins refused to transfer all four lots, Mr Conlon sued 
for specific performance. 
The Court of Appeal held by a majority (2 to 1) that she qualified for relief under 
section 6(1) (a)(iii) of the Act. The parties were "each influenced in their respective 
decisions to enter into the contract by a different mistake about the same matter of 
fact or law." 
McMullin J agreed with the High Court Judge Greig J and found that the defendant's 
mistake was in thinking that she was only selling lots 1 to 3. The plaintiff's mistake 
was that the defendant intended to sell lots 1 to 4. 101 
More detailed was the reasoning of Woodhouse P. 102 : 
"He103 mistakenly thought she was consciously selling all of the land at the rear of her 
house including the garden; she104 mistakenly thought he was buying merely the land 
beyond the high fence. To put the matter another way, each had a mistaken 
impression about the boundaries of the tract of land being bought and sold. Mr 
Conlon believed that from the outset the vendor had been willing to complete a sale of 
all four lots: about that he was mistaken. On the other hand she believed he had 
limited his purchase to the land north of the fence: about that she was mistaken. It is 
an analysis, which shows that their respective to proceed and finally to enter ino the 
written contract were influenced by a mistaken belief on the one side that was 
different from the mistaken belief on the other and also that each mistake was about 
the size of land to be bought and sold." 
This analysis of the Court of Appeal was strongly criticised by Professor David 
MacLauchlan. Firstly, he argued that there is no mistake about the same matter of fact 
pursuant section 6 (1) (a)(iii). If Mrs Ozolins was mistaken about the intention of Mr 
Conlon and Mr Conlon about her intention then these are mistakes about different 
matters of fact. 105 
101 Conlon v Ozalins [1984] 1 NZLR 489,505 (CA) McMullin J. 
102 Conlon v Ozalins [1984] 1 NZLR 489, 499(CA) Woodhouse P. 
103 (=Mr Conlon) 
104 (:Mrs Ozolins) 
105 D W McLauchlan ''The Demise of Conlon v Ozolins: 'Mistake in Interpretation' or Another Case of 
Mistaken Interpretation?"(l991) 14 NZULR 229,231. 
18 
Secondly, even the cited more detailed reasoning of Woodhouse only "sought to mask 
this difficulty by saying that that the common matter of fact about which the parties 
were mistaken was 'the size of the land to be bought and sold' ." 106 This meets not the 
requirements of a matter of fact, because that requires something capable of 
verification. 107 The size of land to be bought and sold would only have been capable 
of verification if the parties had a common intention about this matter, ex hypothesi, 
the parties had different intentions." 108 Therefore, "the land to be bought and sold" 
could not be verified. 109 
Professor MacLauchlan's criticism shows that no mistake about the same matter of 
fact pursuant section 6(1)(a) was given. In fact the Conlon vs Ozolins case does 
obviously not fit under none of the kind of mistakes of section 6. 
The dissenting judge Somers J formulated it like this: 
"I do not consider that in ordinary parlance it can be said that the purchaser made any 
mistake at all. He intended to buy the four lots described to and inspected by him, and 
that, according to the agreement he did." 110 Somers J also mentioned the 
consequences of such a definition of common mistake: "For as often as one party is 
mistaken in intention the other party will be taken to be relevantly differently 
mistaken about the same matter of fact so as to bring the case within subpara (iii). " 111 
That "could not have been the legislative purpose: If it were subpara (i), which 
requires knowledge by one party of the mistake of the other, seems superfluous." 112 
That is why the reasoning of Woodhouse P. and McMullin J., in which they try to 
explain why a common mistake according to section 6 (l)(a)(i) is given, makes quite 
an artificial impression on an unprejudiced reader. There was simply no common 
mistake, because the only erroneous party is Mrs Ozolins. 
Nevertheless the reasoning of the majority was somehow inevitable. The reason for 
this was simply that the judges wanted to grant relief to Mrs Ozolins but were not able 
to do so under the Act. The Act could not handle the special circumstances of the case 
106 D W McLauchlan "The Demise of Conlon v Ozolins: 'Mistake in Interpretation ' or Another Case of 
Mistaken Interpretation?"(l991) 14 NZULR 229,231. 
107 D W McLauchlan "Mistake as to Contractual Terms" (1986) 12 NZULR 123, 144. 
108 D W McLauchlan "The Demise of Conlon v Ozolins: 'Mistake in Interpretation' or Another Case of 
Mistaken Interpretation?"(l991) 14 NZULR 229,231. 
109 D W McLauchlan "Mistake as to Contractual Terms" (1986) 12 NZULR 123, 144. 
11° Conlon v Ozolins [1984] 1 NZLR 489,508 (CA) Somers J dissenting. 
111 Conlon v Ozolins [1984] 1 NZLR489, 508 (CA) Somers J dissenting. 
112 Conlon v Ozolins [1984] 1 NZLR 489, 508 (CA) Somers J dissenting. 
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that were later described as particular facts. 113 The judges were confronted with the 
decision whether they should take away the garden, which might have been her 
"purpose of life" in her dotage, from an elderly widow. Moreover she had had 
difficulties to express herself in English, so that it was hard to say that the mistake 
was her "fault". Who would want to take away the garden from an old lady under 
such particular facts? 
That is why the decision of the Court of Appeal was determined on social grounds. 114 
Because the Act was viewed as a Code the judges had to find a possibility to grant 
relief within the Act. But within the Act there was just one "back door" to avoid an 
unjust result: to insinuate that a common mistake under the Act was given. So, the 
mistake of Mr Conlon seems to be an insinuation in order to subsume this case under 
the Act. 
Therefore, the judges transformed the actual unilateral mistake of Mrs Ozolins by 
"verbal skill' into a common mistake by selecting as the matter of fact the "size of 
land to be bought and sold". 115 
Woodhouse P explains the application of section 6 (l)(a)(iii) that "the provision being 
remedial does not deserve to be construed narrowly or by any reference to any of the 
rather mixed judicial conclusions based upon Common Law. 116 Instead "the language 
must receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best 
ensure the attainment of the object of the Act. 117 
In this passage of the judgment you can see that the majority judges realised that they 
were defining the common mistake in a broad and very doubtable way. Nevertheless 
"this fair and liberal construction" was the only way to achieve a "just" result within 
the "Code". 
In this case it can be concluded that the Act did not provide the "just" result the 
judges intended to achieve. Therefore, the Act was not successful and it appears that it 
would have been better to stay with the traditional approach. Although in Common 
Law there would have been no possibility to grant relief, because a unilateral mistake 
113 Paulger v Butland Industries [1989) 3 NZLR 549,553 (CA) Hardie Boys J. 
114 Julia Pratt "Paulger v Butland Industries Ltd; a further consideration and interpretation of the 
Contractual Mistakes Act 1977and a limitation of the scope of Conlon v Ozolin" (1991) 2 ICCLR 26, 
28. 
115 A Beck and R Sutton Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 in Law Commission Report No 25: Contract 
Statutes Review, Wellington 1993, 127,137. 
116 Conlon v Ozalins [1984) 1 NZLR 489, 499(CA) Woodhouse P. 
117 Conlon v Ozalins [1984] 1 NZLR 489, 499(CA) Woodhouse P. 
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is not sufficient under the old Common Law as well. But because of Equity the courts 
had the measures to achieve a flexible result. In Equity a unilateral mistake may 
entitle Mrs Ozolins to have the contract rectified 
118 in a way that mitigates the 
hardship of the Common Law result. Therefore, the traditional approach provided the 
flexibility to achieve the "just" result due to the "particular facts. 
Now it should be examined whether Conlon was an outlier-decision. If that would 
have been the case this could have been easily corrected by later decisions of the 
courts, which were coherent with the wordings of the Act and provided the "just 
result" necessary within the Act. 
(ii) Engineering Plastics v J Mercer & Sons Ltd
119 
In this case the defendant ordered 4000 0-rings: the order referred to the plaintiff's 
letter of 20 July but did not repeat the price, which was stated in the letter to be 
"$644.96/c". The plaintiff delivered in all 4075 rings to the defendant and then 
invoiced it for $644.96 per hundred, plus a tooling charge and freight: a total of 
$ 27,246.42 which meant that each 0-ring cost $ 6,67. The defendant had thought that 
each 0-ring was going to cost 43 cents because it had not been realised that$ 644.96 
was the price per hundred. 
The High Court applied Conlon v Ozolins and held that the mistake was one that 
came within the section 6 (l)(a)(iii) of the Act: "Each party had a mistaken belief 
about their respective decisions to enter into the contract. The plaintiff mistakenly 
thought the defendant was intending to agree to buy the 4000 rings for$ 644.96 per 
hundred plus the tooling charge. The defendant mistakenly thought that the plaintiff 
was intending to sell the 4000 rings for $644.96, plus the tooling charge."
120 
As examined above it can be stated as well, that the only person mistaken was the 
defendant. He did not know that he was contracting for 644.96 per hundred and 
therefore his belief was erroneous. Here a unilateral mistake was held as sufficient 
under the Act although there were not particular facts like in Conlon v Ozolins that 
118 Chitty on Contracts(27 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994) 293 and 323. 
119 Engineering Plastics Ltd v Mercer & Sons Ltd (1985) 2 NZLR 72 (HC). 
120 Engineering Plastics Ltd v Mercer & Sons Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 72,82 (HC) Tompkins J. 
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could justify the decision. So, in this case the apprehension of Somers J. became true, 
that every unilateral case could be subsumed under section 6 (1) (a) (iii). 
(iii) Paulger v Butland Industries Ltd
121 
The company Dingwall and Paulger Ltd was in financial difficulties. So Mr 
Paulger122 entered into a contract for the sale of its business, which Paulger expected 
to realise enough money to pay the company's unsecured creditors. 
He sent a letter to the creditors on the company's letterhead advising them of the sale 
and giving assurances that the company would be paying off its creditors within 90 
days. To these assurances he added the words ''The writer personally guarantees that 
all due payments will be made." He signed the letter with "M J Paulger, Chief 
Executive". 
The company was put into receivership before the sale was completed. After the 90 
days- period had expired and its debts remaining unpaid, one of the creditors, Butland 
Industries made demand upon Mr Paulger and subsequently brought summary 
judgment against him, claiming that the letter was a personal guarantee. Paulger 
contended that the letter was a gratuitous promise without legal effect and that he had 
not intended to provide a binding guarantee. 
Mr Paulger's counsel argued that like in Conlon section 6(1)(a)(iii) was satisfied. He 
argued the same matter of fact was the source of the funds for paymentof the 
creditors. The different mistakes were in Mr Paulger "thinking that it would be only 
from the proceeds of sale and in the respondent thinking that it would, if need be, 
come from Mr Paulger's own resources." 123 
The Court of Appeal did not support this contention, but reconsidered Conlon and 
held: "Parliament plainly intended to maintain the well-established principle that 
contracts are to be construed objectively, and to avoid the great uncertainty that would 
arise were a party to be permitted to plead as a mistake that he understood the contract 
to mean something different from its plain and ordinary meaning."
124 
121 Paulger v Butland Industries (1989) 3 NZLR 549 (CA). 
122 ,an officer and founder of this company, 
123 Paulger v Butland Jndustries[l989] 3 NZLR 549, 553 (CA) Hardie Boys J. 
124 Paulger v Butland Industries[l989] 3 NZLR 549,553 (CA) Hardie Boys J. 
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According to the court, section 6(1) (a) (iii) had not been satisfied because "it was not 
a case of common mistake at all. For the respondent was right: It was only Mr Paulger 
who was mistaken." 125 
So the Court of Appeal found that there was no cross- purpose mistake but merely a 
unilateral mistake, which was only in the interpretation of the contract pursuant 
section 6(2). Although the Court departed with this decision from Conlon, it did not 
overrule the decision of Conlon. It instead tried to explain why Conlon was not 
applied. Hardie Boys J referred to the wordings of McMullin J and claimed that the 
mistakes of Conlon and Ozolins were not to be read as to each other's intention. 
He justified this opinion by saying that "Conlon v Ozolins is a decision on its 
particular facts. It is not authority for invoking the Act, where one party 
misunderstood the clearly expressed intention of the other, or where one party meant 
something different from the plain meaning of his own words. "126 
This justification as to why he did not apply Conlon is from a legal point of view 
certainly not sufficient. Butland was as much "mistaken" as Conlon was. In Conlon, 
as well as in Paulger, the plain meaning of the written contract was objectively 
clear_ 121 
A difference to the question whether a mistake pursuant section 6 (1) (a) (iii) was 
given is not recognisable. Some authors assume that the reason why Hardie Boys J 
did not expressly say that Conlon was wrongly decided was that the Court in this 
occasion only comprised three judges, Somers, Wylie and Hardie Boys J. Therefore, it 
was not in the position to overrule Conlon, because the Court of Appeal will consider 
overruling its previous decision only if a full court of at least five judges is sitting.
128 
The better way to interpret the decision of the Court is that he did not want to overrule 
Conlon. 
Hardie Boys J was strikingly honest in not applying Conlon because it was a decision 
on its own "particular facts". These facts were that it would be unjust to take away the 
garden from the old lady. Comparable facts were not given in Paulger. To overrule 
125 Paulger v Butland Industries[1989] 3 NZLR 549, 553 (CA) Hardie Boys J. 
126 Maree Chetwin and Stephen Graw An Introduction to the Law of Contract in New Zealand (2001 3 
ed Brookers Wellington) 244. 
127 Maree Chetwin and Stephen Graw An Introduction to the Law of Contract in New Zealand (2001 3 
ed Brookers Wellington) 244. 
128 Maree Chetwin and Stephen Graw An Introduction to the Law of Contract in New Zealand (2001 3 
ed Brookers Wellington) 243. 
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Conlon would have meant that under cases with such particular facts relief could not 
be granted. In order not to discount the possibility to achieve a "just" result within the 
Act, Hardie Boys J did not overrule Conlon. The result of this decision was in the end 
a very unstable legal solution, where Conlon took over the position that Equity once 
had: To achieve justice in exceptional cases. 
In the end the judges were the ones who were confronted with this "justice problem" 
and had to iron out the flaws of the act. If you remember that one aim of the act was 
to abolish the inherently meaningless tests, it can be stated that this aim has not been 
achieved by the Act, because the judges were forced to develop the Paulger/Conlon 
test to achieve a "just" result within the act. The reason why the judges could not 
achieve this just result was, because the former flexibility of the traditional approach 
was taken away from the judges with the Codification of the few remediable cases of 
section 6. That is especially grave because the declared intention of the Committee 
was to offer more flexibility for the judges. To offer the judges more flexibility on the 
discretion side, but to take away simultaneously the flexibility, when it comes to 
determining whether a remediable case of mistake occurs, just could not work out. 
Here it becomes obvious that the solution of the Act was only a half-hearted approach 
to achieve this aim. If you want to strengthen the role of the judge by giving him more 
flexible remedies you have to go all the way. That means that you have to give the 
judge the possibility to exercise this discretion. The Act was only a half-hearted 
attempt, because the judge had to overcome the hurdles of the narrow prerequisites of 
the Act. Assumed that the intention of the committee was exactly the opposite, 
meaning that they wanted to confine the power of the judges by enacting the narrow 
section 6, what is then the sense of broadening simultaneously the discretion side? So 
the Committee appeared to be half-hearted: on the one hand they found that the judges 
were competent enough to choose exactly the right remedy appropriate for the 
individual case. On the other hand they were not sure that the judges were competent 
enough to determine the cases of mistake, which were remediable. 
Afterwards, this decision129 was applied by the High Court in Shivas v Bank of NZ
130
, 
including the reference to Conlon. But Tipping J confessed in regard to the proper 
interpretation of section 6(l)(a)(iii) he found the approach of the dissenting judge 
129 (Paulger) 
130 Shivas v Bank of NZ (1990) 2 NZLR 327(HC). 
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Somers J, who negated a common mistake, in that case much more convincing than 
that of Woodhouse P and McMullin J who subsumed the case under section 
6(1)(a)(iii). 131 He only applied Conlon because he was bound to apply the law as laid 
down by the majority. 132 
(iv) Mechenex Pacific Services Ltd v TCA Airconditioning Ltd133 
In this case TCA 134 sent a written quotation stating that the offer was for machinery of 
a type and form similar to that specified and that the coils offered were for the duties 
given in the specifications. Attached to the quotation were schedules given in the 
specifications. Those indicated a four-row configuration and a required water flow of 
5.39 litres per second. Mechenex 135 had to install a system with an eight-row model 
and a water flow of 4 litres a second. Mechenex placed, without reading the detailed 
schedules, a written order for "32 coils as per your quotation ... as per spec supplied". 
This order was acknowledged and accepted by TCA. TCA manufactured and 
delivered the coils, but Mechenex rejected them because of the higher water flow 
required and also refused to pay. 
In his reasoning Hardie Boys J explained, "there was no mistake on TCA's part. Its 
quotation was exactly what it was intended to be". There was only a unilateral 
mistake, "if there was one" 136• Therefore, the mistake was "of the same character as 
that of the unfortunate appellant in Paulger v Butland." 137 
Other than in the decision Shivas v Bank of NZ138 the Court of Appeal did not even 
mention Conlon v Ozolins anymore. It appears that, although it was never explicitly 
overruled, the definition like in this case of common mistake should not be followed 
in other cases in the future. 
131 Shivas v Bank of NZ [1990] 2 NZLR 327, 338(HC) Tipping J. 
132 Shivas v Bank of NZ [1990] 2 NZLR 327, 338(HC) Tipping J. 
133 Mechenex Pacific Services Ltd v TCA Airconditioning (New Zealand) Ltd [1991] 2 NZLR 393, 398 
(CA) Hardie Boys J. 
134 (the respondent) 
135 (the appellant) 
136 Mechenex Pacific Services Ltd v TCA Airconditioning (New Zealand) Ltd [1991] 2 NZLR 393, 398 
(CA) Hardie Boys J. 
137 Mechenex Pacific Services Ltd v TCA Airconditioning (New Zealand) Ltd [1991] 2 NZLR 393,398 
(CA) Hardie Boys J. 
138 Shivas v Bank of NZ (1990) 2 NZLR 327(HC). 
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( v) Assessment 
Although it was the intention of the Parliament not to enact purely unilateral mistakes, 
the Court of Appeal in Conlon subsumed a case where only one party was mistaken 
under section 6 l(a)(iii). This decision was from a legal point of view 139 wrong, 
because now every unilateral mistake could be brought under this section. However, 
regarding the "justice" of the individual case the decision appears to be right. 
In Paulger this was recogniced, and since this decision the so-called cross-purpose 
cases were no more subsumed under section 6 l(a)(iii). Therefore, Conlon was not 
explicitly overruled 140. After a while the courts did not mention the decision anymore, 
but this does not mean that the judges would not apply Conlon in a comparable 
situation were justice asks for it. This unstable solution is certainly not helpful to 
achieve another aim of the Act, which was judicial security. If a lawyer were asked 
whether a purely "unilateral" mistake is sufficient to grant relief under the Act, he 
would not be able to answer in a definite way. 
However, what gives more cause for concern is that in Conlon the judges appeared to 
have problems finding a "just" result within the Act. The judges wanted but could not 
grant relief to Mrs Conlon, if they would have applied the Act as it was intended by 
the legislature. To achieve a "just" result that was adequate, because of the "particular 
facts" of Conlon, they had to transform a unilateral mistake into a common mistake. 
This transformation was in the end responsible for a lot of confusion under judges, 
academics and attorneys. 
The solution that is established after Paulger recalls the solution before the Act was 
"codified": Conlon overtook the part, which was formerly occupied by Equity. The 
courts still refer to Conlon as a last resort, in cases where the only "just" result would 
be to grant relief, however pursuant to the Act relief is not available. Thus the judges 
developed in Conlon a way to gain back their flexibility that was taken away from 
them by the Act. Therefore, it appears that the flexible solution of the traditional 
approach was a better way to achieve the "just" result. 
If you analyse why this unstable solution of Conlon/ Paulger occurred the supporter 
of the traditional Common Law would surely purport "because the Statute was 
139 (sticking to the wording of the Act) 
140 ,but only explained, that it was a decision on its "particular facts" 
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enacted". Under the pure Common Law the judges would have maybe been more 
flexible, because they were not required by the legislature to subsume under the Act. 
This surely is one possible way to see it. The more convincing way is that the problem 
was not that there was a new Act, but that this Act was not sufficient to codify the 
Law of Mistake in a "just" way. In this case that means that the differentiation 
between a unilateral and a common mistake, to determine whether relief should be 
granted or not, was not "just". 
The author of this paper purports that a wider understanding of mistake like in the 
German Civil Code141 could offer a more just solution. Here the mistaken party can 
challenge the contract. This wider approach has not given rise to judicial uncertainty, 
because the challenge is aligned to certain obstacles. Firstly, the declaration has to be 
challenged as soon as possible, without culpable delay when the party knows of the 
mistake 142 . 143 Secondly, the consequences for the mistaken party can be grave. The 
mistaken party has to compensate the damage that the other party had because she 
relied on the contract. Therefore, this solution is able to achieve a "just" result without 
sacrificing the judicial certainty, because the mistaken party has primarily an own 
interest that the contract will be performed. 
4 Departure from the ''fundamental" - requirement 
Before the Act a mistake was only remediable if the mistake was to some fundamental 
matter. 144 This fundamental requirement was in two significant ways amended. 
Firstly, it was sufficient for the grant of relief 145 that the mistaken parties were 
"influenced in their decision by the mistake". This wording substituted the original 
formulation "relying on mistake" which was 146 proposed by the Reform Committee. 
The Statute Revision Committee suggested this amendment after "confusion was 
expressed by those who gave evidence at the first hearing of the committee as to what 
could constitute "reliance" upon mistake. 147 The amendment from "relying" to 
141 (BGB) 
142 § 121 BGB (;;;;unverzueglich) 
143 Gerhard Robbers An Introduction to German Law (3 ed, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2003) 214 
144 Bell v Lever Bras Ltd [1932] AC 161(HL). 
145 pursuant all subsections of section 6 (l)(a). 
146 (originally) 
147 Hon Jim McLay (8. September 1977) 413 NZPD 2804. 
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"influence in his decision" was harshly criticized, because it was contended to 
unnecessarily widen the courts jurisdiction to grant relief. 148 
The second significant departure of the fundamental -requirement was that in all 
cases of mistake, relief is only available if the mistaken contract has resulted in a 
disproportionate exchange of values 149 : The result has to be "a substantially unequal 
exchange of values" 150 or a "benefit or obligation substantially disproportionate to the 
consideration therefore" 151 . 
In the "old" Common Law the economical value of the exchange was not a criterion 
to determine whether a mistake was remediable. 152 The decisive criterion was, 
whether the mistake was of a fundamental nature. This is a big difference, because 
when a "substantial inequality of the exchange" of values is given that does not 
necessarily mean that the mistake is "fundamental". 153 154 
(a) Intention for these amendments 
With the enactment of the new "influence" requirement the Legislature intended to 
depart from the previous Common Law. In the Common Law it was decisive that the 
mistake was to some fundamental matter. 155 Only in such cases it was contended, the 
extreme injustice of holding one of the parties to the contract outweighs the general 
principle that apparent contracts should be enforced.
156 
Whether a mistake was fundamental was determined by certain tests developed by the 
courts. There could be no mistake as to quality, for example, unless the thing acquired 
was "different in kind" from the thing expected 157 or unless it related to ari essential 
148 Hon Jim McLay (8. September 1977) 413 NZPD 2804. 
149 John F Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd S Law of Contract in New Zealand (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 304. 
150 pw-suant section 6 (b)(i). 
151 according to section 6(b)(ii). 
152John F Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd S Law of Contract in New 'Zealand (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 304. 
153 John F Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd S Law of Contract in New 'Zealand (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 304. 
154 To put it in other words: The fact that a mistake had resulted in one party expending a considerable 
sum in return for something of much less value did not mean that the mistake was fundamental-what 
was required was that the mistake has resulted in that party receiving something radically different 
from what that which was contracted for. 
155 Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161. 
156 Guenter Treitel The Law of Contract (10th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999) 262. 
157 Kennedy v Panama New 'Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co. Ltd (1866-67) LR 2 QB 580, 
587,588. 
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and integral element of the subject-matter. 158 In contrast to this, under the Act the 
necessity for such "inherently meaningless tests" should disappear. The requirement 
of "influence" is already satisfied, if the party merely shows, that the mistake ( of fact 
or law) was one of the factors, which he considered in deciding whether to enter into 
the contract. 159 This would not be a sufficient criterion to satisfy the named 
fundamental requirement under the Common Law. Therefore, by the use of the word 
"influenced" it is clearly contemplated that the mistake need not have to be so serious 
as to entirely negate consent as to the whole transaction. 160 
It appears that the intention was to amend the narrow requirement of "fundamental 
matter". The intention to widen the applicability in this context is also expressed by 
the amendment from the original wording "relying" to "influence". To show reliance 
the party would have to show that it was the fact or state of affairs about which he was 
mistaken that actually induced him to enter into the contract. 161 In contrast to that the 
word "influenced" merely requires that the party have to show that the mistake was 
one of the factors, which he considered in deciding whether to enter the contract. 
162 
But the Reform Committee not only wanted to change the fundamental-requirement 
because it wanted to widen the possibilities in which relief could be granted. It also 
viewed the definition of "fundamental" as imprecise, because it was "too broad to be 
a satisfactory description". 163 With the enactment of the disproportionate values 
requirement in section 6 (1) (b) the Committee wanted to precise in which cases 
according to the Committee relief should be granted. The Committee viewed the "law 
of mistake as essentially pragmatic, concerned with the maintenance of substantial 
justice in contracts rather than with the perpetuation of an idealistic concept of 
"consent". 164 This was emphasised further by stating "the mere fact that a contract has 
become somewhat different from that what was intended ought not to warrant relief 
158 G L Lang "The Contractual Mistake Act 1977"(1978) 4 Otago LR 245, 251. 
159 Donald J Lange "Statutory Reform of the Law of Mistake"(l980) 80 Osg HL.T 429,454; G L Lang 
"The Contractual Mistake Act 1977"(1978) 4 Otago LR 245, 250 .. 
160 John F ButTOWS, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd S La.w of Contract in New Zealand (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 302. 
161 G L Lang "The Contractual Mistake Act 1977"(1978) 4 Otago LR 245, 250. 
162 Donald J Lange "Statutory Reform of the Law of Mistake"(l 980) 80 Osg HL.T 429,454; G L Lang 
"The Contractual Mistake Act 1977"(1978) 4 Otago LR 245, 250 .. 
163 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Repon on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976,15. 
164 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 20. 
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unless the contract has also become unfair." 165 Therefore, cases could be excluded 
where the concern of the mistaken party not to deal with the other of them was 
personal rather than economic. 166 
(b) The experience with these innovations 
Only in rare cases since the enactment have the judges construed the influence-
requirement in a narrow way. For example in Mitchell v Pattison the Court held that 
the mistake should be a significant factor. 167 
Besides the influence requirement has been widely construed as the Committee 
intended it. 168 In Ware v Johnson for example Prichard J held that "influence" means 
"something which both parties must necessarily have accepted in their minds as an 
essential and integral element of the subject matter", bearing in mind that 
"essentiality" is no longer the necessary ingredient." 169 Under the terms of this wide 
understanding of mistake only in cases were a party is entirely indifferent to the 
matter in question, it cannot be said that the decision to enter the contract was 
"influenced" in any way. 170 
Regarding the introduction of the requirement of a substantial inequality there have 
been some discussions and insecurities about what exactly substantially unequal and 
substantial disproportionate means. 171 Sometimes the courts held that a rough 
benchmark of 10-25 % difference in value was sufficient172 but in other cases a bigger 
disparity in value was necessary. 173 
165 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 20. 
166 Brian Coote "The Contractual Mistake Act as a Code: Some Further Thoughts" (2002) 8 NZBLQ 
223,225. 
167 Mitchell v Pattison (28 June 1990) HCA 1163/84, Gault J; A Beck and R Sutton Contractual 
Mistakes Act 1977 in Law Commission Report No 25: Contract Statutes Review, Wellington 1993, 
127,136. 
168 Shotover Mining Ltd v Brownlie (30 September 1987 )HC CP 96/86, 158.McGechan J): 
A Beck and R Sutton Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 in Law Commission Report No 25: Contract 
Statutes Review, Wellington 1993, 127,136. 
169 Ware v Johnson [1984] 2 NZLR 518,538 (HC) Prichard J. 
170 John F Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd S Law of Contract in New Zealand (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 303. 
171 Maree Chetwin and Stephen Graw An Introduction to the Law of Contract in New Zealand ( 2001 
3rd ed Brookers Wellington) 245. 
172 Conlon v Ozolins (1984) 1 NZLR 489(CA). 
173 Engineering Plastics Ltd v J Mercer & Sons Ltd (1985) 2 NZLR 72(CA). 
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Sometimes the courts were very precise in determining why a disproportional 
exchange of value was given. For example in Snodgrass v Hammington174 the Court 
of Appeal held that the difference of $35.-,000 to $40.-,000 between the contract price 
and the value of the house that was subject matter of the contract satisfied the 
requirement of substantial inequality. In other cases this requirement was just 
affirmed, like in Slater v Wilmshurst without further explications and just contended 
that "there was a very substantial obligation quite disproportionate to the 
consideration received as Crown". 175 
( c) Assessment 
The introduction of the wider requirement of influence has been received very well 
and has not led to an opening of the floodgates for the grant of relief, which was 
feared. 176 However, the legislature acted again half-hearted because this wide 
requirement is incoherent with the very narrow enactment of remediable cases in 
section 6. 
With the enactment of the "substantial unequal" and "substantial disproportionate" the 
legislature chose to enact judicial indefinite terms and, therefore, left it to the courts to 
determine when a disproportionate exchange of values is given. This could also be 
regarded as half-hearted if you remember that the aim of the legislature was to 
achieve more judicial certainty. But the legislature cannot be blamed for this, because 
it appears to be the right decision to leave questions, which depend very strongly on 
the individual case to the courts. 
However, the enactment of this requirement appears to be in another aspect the wrong 
decision. The legislature emphasised with this prerequisite that it saw the law of 
mistake as essentially pragmatic. Relief should not be granted when the contract has 
become somewhat different from that what was intended ought not to warrant relief 
unless the also become unfair when contract has."177 Unfairness according to the 
Committee occurs when the exchange of values was "substantial unequal" or 
"substantial disproportionate". The mistake the Committee made in this context was 
to equate unfairness with economical unfairness. That simultaneously did not cover 
174 Snodgrass v Hammington (1995) 10 PRNZ 672(CA). 
175 Slater Wilmshurst Ltd v Crown Group Custodian Ltd [1991] 1 NZLR 344, 357 (HC) Gallen J. 
176 Hon Jim McLay (8. September 1977) 413 NZPD 2804 .. 
177 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 20. 
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cases where the reason for the unfairness was not economical. For example it could 
have been easily contended that the exchange of values in Conlon was not substantial 
unequal. 178 But even if you assume that the exchange of value was not substantially 
unequal it would not have been just not to grant relief to Mrs Ozolins. Therefore, the 
adjustment of the values from a more personal to a more economical law of mistake 
took away a lot of the flexibility to achieve a "just" result. 
B The Implementations of More "Flexible" Remedies 
If in the previous Common Law a fundamental mistake existed the contract was void. 
If the court held that there was no fundamental mistake the contract was valid and the 
mistaken party had to perform. 
Now under the Act if the prerequisites of section 6 are given, the court may grant 
relief according to section 7. 
l Intention 
The old "all or nothing" solutions in Common Law to hold a contract valid or void 
was regarded as too inflexible. Now the court has a variety of possibilities to exercise 
its discretion. The judge can declare the contract to be valid, and subsisting in whole 
or in part, he can cancel the contract and grant relief by variation of the contract or by 
restitution or compensation. 179 
In the Act are almost no guidelines as to how discretion shall be exercised. There are 
no statements in which cases what type of relief is appropriate. The judge is also very 
free in determining which circumstances are important "whether to grant relief' 180 
One consideration that the court should take into account is according to section 7 (2) 
"the extent to which the party ... caused the mistake". So, the Act implemented a very 
wide understanding of discretion for the courts. 
178 Like Greig Jin the High Comt decision did. 
179 Section 7(3) 
180 Section 7(2). 
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2 Experience 
In practice the broadening of the remedies available under the Act have been received 
well. 181 
For example in Engineering Plastics Ltd v J Mercer & Sons Ltd1 82 Tompkins J used 
the relief-power for a compromise. In this case the plaintiff intended to charge$ 6.67 
per ring and the defendant intended to pay$ 0.429 per ring. Tompkins J varied the 
contract by providing a price of$ 4 per ring. 183 In the previous Common Law, 
assumed that a fundamental mistake would have been given, the defendant would not 
have had to pay. Assumed that there would have been no mistake of a fundamental 
nature the contract would have been valid and the defendant would have had to pay 
$ 6.67 per ring. 
Therefore, the Act gives the courts the flexible remedies that were intended. Courts 
have now enough possibilities to achieve a just result. 
However, little can be said about the way in which the courts exercise the discretion 
powers conferred upon them. 184 There is no clear policy recognisable to figure out 
which kind of factors influenced the discretion in which way. One factor surely is "the 
extent the mistaken party has caused the mistake", because this factor is explicitly 
named in section 7 (2). But this is only "one of the considerations" taken into account 
and not the crucial consideration. Which other considerations are taken into account 
cannot be said yet, because of the relatively few cases in which relief has actually 
been granted. 185 
Further it is not clear how "caused" is construed by the courts and whether it is 
important that the mistake was caused carelessly. In Australian Guarantee 
Corporation (NZ) v Wyness the Court of Appeal only insinuated that in cases where a 
party caused carelessly a mistaken belief in the other party, this party will forfeit relief 
181 Andrew Beck and Richard Sutton Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 in Law Commission Report No 
25: Contract Statutes Review, Wellington 1993, 127,160. 
182 Engineering Plastics Ltd v J Mercer & Sons Ltd [1985) 2 NZLR 72, 83 (HC)Tompkins J. 
183 Engineering Plastics Ltd v J Mercer & Sons Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 72, 83(HC) Tompkins J. 
184 John F Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd S Law of Contract in New Zealand (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 307. 
185 John F Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd S Law of Contract in New Zealand (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 307. 
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in the court's discretion. 186 However, a clear policy in this direction cannot be 
recognised. 
There is also a degree of uncertainty as to the correct principles to be applied in the 
nature or quantum of any relief to be granted. In some cases like in Engineering 
Plastics Ltd v J Mercer & Sons Ltd1 87 the courts tried to use the discretion in a very 
innovative way and achieved results that were not available under the law before. In 
other cases the courts did not use the discretion in such a way, but gave compensation 
on the same basis as in any other case where a contract had not been performed 
according to the terms, without further exercise of the discretion. 188 
3 Assessment 
Although the new remedies brought more flexibility on the discretion side to the 
courts it has to be stated again that the codification of these remedies was in the 
overall context a half-hearted approach. 
First, there are concerns whether the enactment of these remedies really changed a lot 
in comparison to the former law. The basic approach for the codification was that the 
remedies available in cases of mistake were too inflexible. 189 This approach only 
seems to be right if you just consider the law of mistake in Common Law. But besides 
the Common Law there still was the possibility for the granting of relief in Equity. It 
appears to be artificial not to consider Equity in this circumstance. Equity gives relief 
in certain circumstances when it would be a hardship to hold a party to a contract 
which was valid, because the "narrow" fundamental" mistake under the Common 
Law was not satisfied. In Equity the "more flexible remedies" already existed: 1
90 It 
could refuse specific performance 191 , it could rescind the terms of the contract, again 
on terms or it could rectify a contractual document where a mistake had been made, 
not in the formation but in the recording of a contract. 192 Admittedly those flexible 
remedies were only available when a hardship for one party was given, but it can be 
argued that only in these circumstances those remedies are really needed. 
186 Australian Guarantee Corporation (NZ) Ltd v Wyness [1987] 2 NZLR 326, 334 (CA). Somers J. 
187 Engineering Plastics Ltd v J Mercer & Sons Ltd (1985] 2 NZLR 72, 83(HC) Tompkins J. 
188 Ware v Johnson (1984) 2 NZLR 518 (HC). 
189 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 8. 
190 Guenter Treitel The Law of Contract (10 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999) 286. 
191 (or grant that remedy only on terms) 
192 GuenterTreitel The Law of Contract (11 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003) 311. 
And only in those cases of hardship the requirements of certainty emphasised by the 
Common Law was sacrificed in Equity. 193 Under the new law there is a wide 
discretion of the court independent whether there is a hardship or not. The legislature 
failed to enact guidelines for the courts how to exercise this discretion. Therefore, it 
appears that under the Act there is a much greater uncertainty as to how the judges 
will decide than before. 
So, in this context the Act appears to be a half-hearted approach: On the one hand the 
Act should abolish the equitable doctrine that "is not altogether free from 
uncertainty". 194 On the other hand the legislature empowers the courts with so much 
discretionary power in every case of mistake that it cannot be predicted what the 
result of a litigation regarding mistakes might be. The only factor that is named 195 is 
the extent to which the party has caused the mistake. 196 It is not clear which other 
factors are important for the discretion. The development of these factors was left to 
the Courts, but until now there "is little to be said about the way in which the courts 
exercise the powers". 197 Regarding judicial certainty the reform was certainly not 
helpful in this context and therefore half-hearted. 
But even if we leave the purported intention of legal certainty aside the enactment of 
the new remedies was a half-hearted approach in the overall context. At this point it 
has to be emphasised that the sacrifice of judicial certainty could have been easily 
justified because the high aim was to achieve more "flexibility" and therefore more 
"justice" in the individual case. As pointed out before the Act appears to be in this 
context incoherent. The judges have to overcome the narrow named cases of section 6 
to have the opportunity to exercise their wide discretion. That means the flexibility, 
which is given to the courts on the one hand to achieve a "just" result on the 
discretion-side is taken away from the courts on the prerequisites-side. So, the court 
has in some cases no possibilities to achieve the "just" result in the individual case 
that would be appropriate because it does not fit into a category of section 6. 198 
193 Guenter Treitel The Law of Contract (10 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999) 286. 
194 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 7. 
195 in section 7 (2). 
196 As shown above it is not even clear what is meant by "cause". 
197 John F Buffows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd S Law of Contract in New Zealand (2 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 307. 
198 See the problematic of unilateral mistake and constructive knowledge. 
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IV HA VE THE OTHER BIG INTENTIONS OF THE ACT BEEN ACHIEVED? 
Beside the already examined intentions, there were other major aims that the Act 
should achieve. The Committee formulated these aims as the "amalgamation of 
fragmented doctrines into a single body of law" and "the abolition of the 
differentiation of mistake in Common Law and Equity". These major aims were 
expressed in section 5 (1): "the Act shall have effect in place of the rules of the 
common law and of equity governing the circumstances in which relief may be 
granted, on the grounds of mistake." 
More than 25 years after the enactment it should be examined whether these aims of 
the act have been achieved in the practice. Therefore, the practice of the courts since 
1977 will be appreciated. 
A Amalgamation of Fragmented Doctrines into a Single Body of Law 
One in the Report of the Committee explicitly named objective of the Act was "the 
amalgamation of the present fragmented doctrine, some based upon mistake and 
others based upon different legal devices, into a single body of law dealing with 
mistake". 199 The intention was to abolish the different concepts related to mistakes, 
which sometimes were announced as relating to mistake and sometimes to such as 
failure of "offer and acceptance to correspond".200 
One rule of the common law that was related to mistake is the objective principle of 
Smith v Hughes. According to this principle you are bound despite lack of intention, if 
you lead another person to reasonably believe in the terms you are offering. 201 In this 
case the promisor typically is mistaken. 
Evidently in the Act there is no section, which would codify the objective principle 
although it is related to mistakes. Therefore, pursuant section 5 of the Act this rule of 
the Common Law is pre-empted and the objective principle was abolished by the 
Act.202 
199 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976,10. 
20° Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 3. 
201 Smith v Hughes [1871] LR 6 QB 597,607 (CA) Blackbum J. 
202 that would be the conclusion of DF Dugdale "A Code is a Code is a Code" (2002) 8 NZBQL 129. 
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For the purpose of this paper the question that should be asked is whether this 
mistaken-related principle is still applied beside the Act. If this is the case it could be 
argued, that the "amalgamation of the present fragmented doctrines into a single body 
of mistake" has not been achieved. 
1 The development in the adjudication of the courts 
The question whether the objective principle could still be applied beside the Act was 
again firstly considered in the highly discussed decision of Conlon. 203 204 
Greig J of the High Court asked, "whether that principle can be applied in the facts of 
this case having regard to the provisions of the Contractual Mistake Act 1977." He 
invoked also on the earlier decision of McCullough v McGrath Stock and Poultry 
Ltd205. Greig J agreed with the judgment of Mahon J in that decision to apply the 
principle beside the Act and Mrs Ozolins was therefore bound by the principle. 206 If 
that conclusion would be wrong and the prerequisites of section 6 of the Act would be 
given he would take this objective principle into account: 
"Principles such as Smith v Hughes are intended to provide justice and are to maintain 
in the words of 4(2) of the Act, the general security of contractual relationships. This 
mistake was created and supported by the conduct of the defendant and she was 
careless and negligent in signing the agreement, which specifically provided for the 
sale of the four lots. It would not be just, in my view, to grant her relief."207 Greig J. 's 
view can be summarised that the objective principle could be applied both, beside the 
Act and also in the Act by exercising the discretion. Therefore, he decided that Mrs 
Ozolins was bound to the contract and relief could not be granted. 
The question whether the objective principle of Smith v Hughes still could still be 
applied was negated by the Court of Appeal, Mc Mullin J stated clearly208 : 
"However, there is nothing in the Contractual Mistake Act nor the report of the 
committee to support the view taken by Mahon J which, if adopted, would severely 
203 Conlon v Ozolins (1984) 1 NZLR 489. 
204 For the facts of the case see above under ... 
205 McCullough v McGrath's Stock & Poultry LTD [1981] 2 NZLR 426, 428(HC) Mahon J. 
zo6 Conlon v Ozolins [1984] 1 NZLR 489,494 (HC) Greig J: "Although the Act created a code it did not 
include in that code the principle exemplified by Smith v Hughes since that operated only upon the 
~uestion that a mistake in fact existed, which is not included in the statutory code." 
2 7 Conlon v Ozolins [1984] 1 NZLR 489,495 (HC) Greig J. 
208 Conlon v Ozolins [1984] 1 NZLR 489,504- (CA) McMullin J. 
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restrict the operation of the Act itself. In enacting the Act Parliament provided an 
entirely new code applicable to every case of mistake, which fitted within its 
framework. It replaced with its own provisions the old and unsatisfactory rules of the 
Common Law and those others which Equity had evolved in an endeavour to mitigate 
the harshness of the former. Thus a person who is a party to a contract, to which some 
element of mistake attaches, must now look to the statute and now longer to the 
Common Law or Equity for his remedy, if there is to be one." 
So according to McMullin beside the Act was no place for the Smith v Hughes 
principle: ''To hold that the Smith v Hughes principle still operates to defeat the 
application of the Act would be to deprive the statute of much of its force; it would 
ignore the very wording of section 5 (1) which expressly says that the Act shall have 
effect in place of the rules of the common law and of equity governing the 
circumstances in which relief may be granted on the grounds of mistake."209 
According to the majority of the Court of Appeal the mistaken-related principle of 
Smith v Hughes could no more be applied beside the Act, so that this decision is 
coherent with the intention of the legislature that beside the Act there should exist no 
mistaken-related concepts. 
Contrary to Conlon the High Court in Engineering Plastics v J Mercer & Sons Ltd210 
held that "by accepting the plaintiff's offer in the manner in which it had, the 
defendant conducted itself that the plaintiff could reasonably believe that it was 
assenting to the terms contained in the letter of 20 July".211 Although in this judgment 
Tompkins J granted relief under the Act he expressively applied the Smith v Hughes 
principle and held that the defendant was first bound by the contract.212 Against the 
intention of the legislature a mistaken-related principle was applied beside the Act. 
This High Court decision was confirmed by the judgment of the Court of Appeal in 
Paulger v Butland Industries Ltd. 213 Although it held that Paulger was mistaken21 4, it 
still applied the mistaken-related principle of Smith v Hughes2 15 : 
209 Conlon v Ozolins [1984] 1 NZLR 489,504- (CA) McMullin J. 
210 Engineering Plastics Ltd v Mercer & Sons Ltd (1985) 2 NZLR 72 (HC). 
211 Engineering Plastics Ltd v Mercer & Sons Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 72, 78/79 (HC) Tompkins J. 
212 Engineering Plastics Ltd v Mercer & Sons Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 72, 78/79 (HC) Tompkins J. 
213 Paulger v Butland Industries (1989) 3 NZLR 549 (CA). 
214 Paulger v Butland Industries [1989] 3 NZLR 549,553 (CA) Hardie Boys J. 
215 Paulger v Butland Industries [1989] 3 NZLR 549,552 (CA) Hardie Boys J. 
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''The letter sent by Paulger must be construed from the point of view of the reasonable 
man in the shoes of the recipient. .. " 
It held further that "Parliament plainly intended to maintain the well-established 
principle that contracts are to be construed objectively"216 . Like the High Court in 
Engineering Plastics v J Mercer & Sons Ltd they afterwards held that the Act applied 
but decided that none of the prerequisites of the subsections were fulfilled. Therefore, 
the court did not grant relief. 
2 The experience with the Act regarding this intention 
The Introduction of the Act led to confusion in relation to the question whether the 
Contract Formation Rules were still applicable beside the Act or not. 
According to Conlon it was abolished, because it was not in the Act and pursuant to 
section 5(1) this rule of Common Law was pre-empted by the Act. This decision 
should have led to a clarity whether all mistaken related-Common Law rules are pre-
empted by the Act or not, because it was also in conformity with the expressed 
intention of the Legislation. 
But in the end this decision led to more confusion. Professor McLauchlan held that 
this Court of Appeal decision supported his view that the common law principles 
remain relevant beside the Act.217 Other commentators still appear to view the 
objective theory as eroded218 ; others draw a distinction between contract formation 
rules and pre-empted mistake claims.219 After this decision not only the possible 
intention of the Parliament was questioned but also the intention of the majority of the 
Court of Appeal, whether they still applied the objective theory or not. 
Because of this uncertainty it became necessary to explain the Conlon decision. In 
Paulger v Butland it had to be clarified that the objective principle was not abolished 
by the Act. Also the following decisions could not only focus on the Act, but also had 
to deal with the decision in Conlon. 
216 Paulger v Butland Industries [1989] 3 NZLR 549,550 (CA) Hardie Boys J. 
217D W McLauchlan, "The Contractual Mistakes "Code": A Polite Response to Mr Dugdale" (2002) 8 
NZBLQ 132, 135. 
218 DF Dugdale "A Code is a Code is a Code" (2002) 8 NZBQL 129. 
219 Richard Sutton "The Code of Contractual Mistake: What went wrong?"(2003) 9 NZBLQ 
234,243:'This (the objective principle) is an objective example of an old rule upholding the contract, 
being made subject to a new rule that may leasd to the contract being void." 
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3 Assessment 
After all the discussions the objective theory is still applied by the courts. The 
introduction of the Act had at least no impact on this rule of contract formation, which 
is related to mistakes. So that the aim of the legislation that was "the amalgamation of 
the present fragmented doctrines ... into a single body of law dealing with mistake"220 
has not been achieved by the Act. Therefore, most of the courts seem to appreciate 
that the Legislation did not want to abolish this principle. The only result of the Act 
was confusion in the jurisdiction and between legal academics whether the Act 
abolished the objective principle or not. 
The intention of the "amalgamation of the fragmented doctrines into a "single body of 
law" was doomed to fail right from the beginning. The approach to codify just 
partially the law of contracts by several "mini-codes" was for this aim the wrong 
approach. That is because it ignores the fact that mistake-related doctrines are found 
in different areas of the Contract Law. If you want to codify such principles of 
contract formation221 into a" single body of law" you necessarily have to codify the 
contract formation rules as well. The contractual law of mistake touches not only 
questions of the rescission of a contract but also principles of contract formation. As 
shown the law of mistake is deeply rooted in the Contract Law. Hence, you cannot 
"codify" one part of the law of contract222 and leave another part "uncodified"223 . The 
New Zealand experience has shown that such an attempt to "codify just extracts of the 
contract law in "mini-codes", only leads to confusion and judicial uncertainty. Instead 
of this half-hearted approach, there are only two ways to deal with the law of mistake: 
The first solution is a codification of the whole contract law; the second solution is to 
leave the development of the contract law totally to the courts. 
22° Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976,10. 
221 (like the objective principle) 
222 (for example the law of rescission) 
223 (for example the law of contract formation) 
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B The Abolition of the Differentiation of Mistake in Common Law and Equity 
At Common Law, if there was a mistake the contract was void, whereas Equity took 
the view that the contract was voidable and would grant relief in certain 
circumstances. 224 
The Law Committee saw the problem that the law of mistakes was a fragmented 
series of doctrines, which were based upon different concepts.225 These "double 
standard" for mistake was not altogether free from uncertainty. 226 To unify and 
simplify the law of mistakes the Committee created section 5 (1) which stated, "this 
Act shall have effect in place of the rules of Common Law and of Equity governing 
the circumstances in which relief may be granted, on the grounds of mistake ... " 
The intention of the Committee was to abolish the old distinction between mistake in 
Common Law and Equity, which was appreciated as an unnecessary complexity, and 
artificiality in the law of mistake". Section 5 (1) is the only section were this intention 
is expressed, because according to this section now all relief in relation to mistake can 
only be granted within the Act. 
1 Experience and assessment 
With the enactment of section 5 the double standard of mistake, because of the 
"narrow" mistake in Common Law and the wider equitable doctrine of mistake, was 
abolished. In this context it is interesting that the legislature chose to enact the broader 
understanding of mistake by stating that a mistake means also a mistake of law227 , 
which was until then only in Equity a remediable mistake. The abolition of this 
artificial distinction was in the year 1977 a very progressive and bold step. 
However, the enactment was still a half-hearted approach: on the one hand the judicial 
uncertainty that occurred because of the distinction between mistake in Common Law 
224 Maree Chetwin and Stephen Graw An Introduction to the Law of Contract in New Zealand (2001 
3rd ed Brookers Wellington) 236. 
225 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 3. 
226 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 8. 
227 Section 2(1). 
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and Equity should be eroded, the uncertainty was augmented by the widening on the 
discretion-side for the question how and what kind of relief should be granted. 228 
So, it appears that the legislature only shifted the problem of judicial certainty that 
was caused by the distinction between mistake in Common Law and mistake in 
Equity to another level. First the judicial security was not developed very much; 
because although no mistake in terms of Common Law was given, there still could be 
a mistake in Equity that nullifies a contract. Now this problem is solved, because 
either there is a mistake or there is none. However, it is not clear what the result will 
be of this mistake. Even assumed the Law Reform Committee accepted this shift of 
the problem229 in order to preserve the flexibility the approach they chose in the Act 
was only a half-hearted way. 
That is because the court has only theoretically the huge discretion of what kind of 
relief and how he will grant relief. In reality this flexibility is not worth very much, 
because the courts have to overcome first the narrow prerequisites of section 6 to 
grant the wide discretion of section 7. 230 
So, also in this context the Act was only a half-hearted approach. 
2 Developments in a "pure" Common Law jurisdiction 
As you can see in New Zealand, the "partial codification" of the contract law did not 
achieve the determined aims, because it was a half-hearted approach. Therefore, it is 
interesting to evaluate the recent developments in "pure" Common Law Countries 
like the UK and Canada were until now no legislative intervention has occurred. 
(a) United Kingdom 
Like in New Zealand, prior to the Act, in the UK until recently the traditional 
distinction existed between the "fundamental" mistake in Common Law and the 
broader approach of the equitable doctrine of mistake. According to a decision of the 
EWCA this has changed: 
In The Great Peace231 the contract for salvage services to be provided by the 'Great 
Peace' for the 'Cape Providence' 232 , that was in serious difficulties at sea, was made 
228 See above: the implementation of more flexible remedies, page 32. 
229 ,and therefore simultaneously the problem of judicial uncertainty, 
230 See above: the implementation of more flexible remedies, page 32. 
231 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd (The Great Peace) (2002) EWCA 
Civ 1407; [2003] QB 679. 
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on a shared assumption that the 'Great Peace' would be 35 miles away and therefore 
the nearest available ship. Then it was discovered that in fact it was 410 miles away 
and the defendants, after finding a closer vessel that could render support, wanted to 
cancel the contract. 
At first instance Toulson J held that the contract was not void at law, because the 
mistake did not turn the contract into something essentially different from what the 
parties bargained. 233 Then he turned to a mistake in Equity and stated that there is no 
right to rescind in Equity on grounds of common mistake a contract that is valid and 
enforceable at Common Law.234 Further he stated to hold that the court has discretion 
to set aside a contract entered into under a fundamental mistake if the court considers 
that the general justice of the case merits it "puts palm tree justice in place of party 
autonomy. 235 
The Court of Appeal upheld this view that there is no separate jurisdiction in Equity 
to set aside a contract on the ground of common mistake if the contract is not void at 
Common Law. 236 None of the cases following Solle v Butcher defined a test of 
mistake that gives rise to the (supposed) equitable jurisdiction to rescind in a manner 
that distinguishes this from a test of mistake that renders a contract void in law.237 
Further it is not possible "to define satisfactorily two different qualities of mistake, 
one operating in law and one in equity".238 
That meant that the contract was held valid and the defendants had to pay $ 82.500 
according to the terms of the contract. According to the contract this sum was the 
minimum amount that the defendant had to pay as a cancellation fee. 
Therefore, in the UK the distinction between mistakes in Common Law and in Equity 
has been abolished. 
So it appears that in the UK the legal position is now the same as in New Zealand. For 
this reason the result under the Act would have to be the same. But surprisingly it is 
232 (the Great Peace and the Cape Providence are both ships. 
233 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd (The Great Peace) [ 2001] 151 
NU 1696; (2001] All ER (D) 152 at (56]. 
234 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd (The Great Peace) [ 2001] 151 
NU 1696; [2001] All ER (D) 152 at at [118]. 
235 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd (The Great Peace) [ 2001] 151 
NU 1696; (2001] All ER (D) 152 at[l 19-120]. 
236 Chitty on Contracts(29 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) 393. 
237 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd (The Great Peace) (2002] EWCA 
Civ 1407; [2003] QB 679 at [153]. 
238 ibid. 
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very questionable whether this is the case. Both parties were mistaken about the 
distance between the vessels. Thus according to section 6 l(a) (ii) of the Act both 
"parties were influenced in their respective decisions to enter into the contract the 
same matter of fact. A "substantially unequal exchange of values" can be seen in the 
fact that the defendants had to pay$ 82.500, which the defendant has to pay without 
receiving the services of the Great Peace granted. So the defendant could get relief 
granted under the Act unless the court find that the defendant would have to bear the 
risk of the mistake. 239 The contract does not include any provision that the defendant 
has assumed the risk of a mistake about the distance between the vessels. The only 
way that the courts could find this would be to hold that the term of the cancellation 
fee in the contract implies that the defendant has to bear the risk for any cancellation. 
So, the courts would have some problems to achieve the same result like the Court of 
Appeal in the UK. If the courts would not come to this finding, the Court would have 
to consider on the discretion-side according to section section 7(2) whether the 
defendant caused the mistake and were in some way to blame for not ensuring that the 
claimants gave an appropriate undertaking on location.240 
Hence the legal positions in New Zealand and in the UK are not the same although in 
both countries the equitable doctrine of mistake has been abolished. 
(b) Canada 
At this point it is enlightening to look at a Commonwealth country, where still a pure 
Common Law solution exists. In Pacific National Investments Ltd. v Victoria 
(City/41 the Supreme Court of Canada recently confirmed that in a case of common 
mistake242 "the doctrine of unjust enrichment provides an equitable cause of action 
that retains a large measure of remedial flexibility to deal with different circumstances 
according to principles rooted in fairness and good conscience. This is not to say that 
it is a form of palm tree justice that varies with the temperament of the sitting 
judges. "243 
239 according to section 6 (l)(c) 
240 Adam Chandler and James Devenney and Jill Poole "Common Mistake: Theoretical justification 
and remedial inflexibility"[2004] JBL 34, 54. 
241 Pacific National Investments Ltd. v Victoria(City) [2004] SCC 75 para 13 Binnie J. 
242 In this case the parties were mistaken about the enforceability of their agreement [at 39). 
243 Pacific National Investments Ltd. v Victoria(City) [2004] SCC 75 para 13 Binnie J. 
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In this case an agreement was made which contented a "rezoning commitment". Both 
parties were mistaken about the enforceability of their agreement. The result of this 
mistake would have been that the defendant244 would have received extra works and 
improvements valued at $1.08 million without anything in return. Although the 
contractual claim was rejected because the city lacked the authority to make the 
zoning commitment it did, the Supreme Court granted an equitable remedy and held 
that the respondent City was obligated to pay to the plaintiff $1.08 million. 
Binnie J emphasised in his judgment all the starches that Equity in such cases 
provides: "equity looks to substance rather than to form". He identified "the substance 
of the problem" as the "1.08 million worth of improvements which were found to be 
the fruit of an ultra vires demand". This was according to the judge an "unjustified 
windfall at the plaintiffs expense". Therefore, "Courts of Equity have at all times 
relieved against honest mistake in contracts ... where not to correct the mistake would 
be to give an unconscionable advantage to either party."245 
Eventually, he emphasised that "the equitable doctrine has the remedial flexibility to 
reverse an enrichment the trial judge found to be manifestly unjust". 
Other than in the UK the equitable doctrine was upheld because the doctrine was 
evaluated as being necessary to provide the necessary flexibility that is required in 
some individual cases to achieve a just result. 
( c) Assessment 
The developments in the UK and in Canada are significant because they give an idea 
how the law of mistake would have developed if the half-hearted codification would 
not have taken place in New Zealand. 
In Canada the situation is very much comparable with the legal status in New Zealand 
prior to the Act. The equitable doctrine comes into play when under the Common 
Law relief cannot be granted but according to principles like fairness and good 
conscience246 is needed to achieve a "just" result. Therefore, in Canada Equity assures 
that the courts have the "flexibility" that is needed to mitigate the otherwise unjust 
result. 
244 (a municipality) 
245 Pacific National Investments Ltd. v Victoria(City) [2004] SCC 75 para 39 Binnie J. 
246 (which are both subspecies of the paramount principle justice) 
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Although this flexibility of the traditional solution was acknowledged by the EWCA 
in the UK, the court chose to abolish the distinction because of the judicial uncertainty 
that arises out of this distinction. Toulson J justified the rejection of the equitable 
doctrine because he held that a court's discretion to set aside a contract entered into 
under a fundamental mistake if the court considers that the general justice of the case 
merits it "puts palm tree justice in place of party autonomy".247 
This perception is a staggering evaluation of the traditional approach and the role of 
the judge in general. It especially misjudges how the courts exercised their discretion 
under the old law. The equitable jurisdiction to set aside a contract has only been 
exercised if the enforcement of the contract would cause hardship to the mistaken 
party.248 Therefore, Binnie J was right when he stated that the exercising of this 
discretionary power is not to say that it is a form of palm tree justice that varies with 
the temperament of the sitting judges. 249 In fact Equity gave the judges the flexibility 
needed in exceptional cases. 
This was also expressed in the evaluation of Lord Phillips MR 250 who appreciated the 
great advantage that "an equitable doctrine to grant rescission on terms where a 
common fundamental mistake has induced a contract gives greater flexibility than a 
doctrine of Common Law which holds the contract void in such circumstances."251 
Although he acknowledged this greater flexibility, which resulted because of the 
discretion that the judges possessed under the traditional approach, he weakened the 
role of the judge by the abolition of the equitable doctrine. 
The result of such a debilitation of the discretion of the judges is inflexibility: the 
contract will be either fully binding or void.252 In a clear case like in the Great Peace 
this might not be a problem, but the flexibility might be necessary to achieve a just 
result in cases with their "own particular facts". 
Now, after the Great Peace decision it will be difficult for the judges in the UK to take 
considerations like fairness and good conscience into account, in cases where it might 
be necessary to achieve a "just" result. To avoid that this undesirable situation does 
247 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd (The Great Peace)(2001) 151 Nl.J 
1696; [2001] All ER (D) 152 at[l 19-120] 
248 Chitty on Contracts(27 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994) 295. 
249 Pacific National Investments Ltd. v Victoria(City) [2004] SCC 75 para 13 Binnie J. 
250 ,although he abolished the equitable doctrine, 
251 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd (The Great Peace) [2002] EWCA 
Civ 1407; [2003] QB 679 at [161] Phillips. 
252 Chitty on Contracts(29 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) 409. 
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not occur Lord Phillips MR demanded that the aim to "give greater flexibility to our 
law of mistake" should be achieved by a legislative intervention. 
The attempt of the Act, that was considered to grant relief for mistakes where it would 
have been sufficient to give rise to the equivalent equitable jurisdiction before the 
passing of the Act253 cannot be recommended in this context. The reasons for this 
evaluation are the already named flaws of the Act. But the experience with the Act 
can be useful for a future codification. A promising approach for a legislative 
intervention could be to enact the broader understanding of mistake in Equity254 , 
which according to Lord Phillips was more flexible. 255 At this point again a view 
from the German Civil Code is illuminating, where a broader understanding of 
mistake is enacted. Here, like in Equity a mistaken contract is only voidable and not 
void. It is also sufficient that just one party is mistaken 256. This wider approach on the 
prerequisite-side strengthens the role of the judge because there is enough scope for 
the judge to achieve a "just" result. Concerns regarding the possible judicial 
uncertainty can also be refuted, because in the Act there are some obstacles for the 
mistaken party enacted.257 
V CONCLUSION 
The Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 was in some ways a very progressive and bold 
attempt to codify the Law of Contractual Mistake. Firstly, there is on the one side the 
equalisation of mistake of law and mistake of fact, which was codified in the Act. 
Secondly, in the Act was also the abolition between the distinction of the Common 
Law and Equity doctrines of mistake enacted. Therefore, it anticipated developments 
that took the pure Common law over twenty years until they were resolved. 
Also a very positive and well-received innovation was the implementation of more 
flexible remedies on the discretion side. 
Unfortunately, at this point it can as well be seen very clearly that the solution of the 
Act was in many ways a half-hearted attempt, because the aim of the act was also to 
253 Slater Wilmshurst Ltd v Crown Group Custodian Ltd (1991] 1 NZLR 344, 357 (HC) Gallen J. 
254 Andrew Phang "Controversy in Common Mistake"(2003) May/Jun Conv & Prop Law 247-256. 
255 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd (The Great Peace) (2002] EWCA 
Civ 1407; (2003] QB 679 at [161]. 
256 (= unilateral mistake) 
257 Explained above on page 27; Gerhard Robbers An Introduction to German Law (3 ed, Nomos, 
Baden-Baden,2003)214 
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achieve judicial certainty. 258 This intention does not go along with the widening of the 
discretion-powers of the courts. 
Also incoherent appears the very wide definition of mistake259 and the wide 
requirement of influence on the one hand and the narrow remediable cases of 
common mistake260 which have to be satisfied for the grant of relief. But these are just 
minor flaws, which are no big problems of the Act. 
A much bigger incoherency, which had grave consequences, was the widening of the 
discretion that contravenes strongly with the narrow cases of section 6. At this point 
the gravest problem of the Act" exists , which is a "justice" problem. This arose 
because only the cases of common and mutual mistake pursuant section 6 were 
remediable. But there were still cases beside those "codified" cases were it would be 
"just" to grant relief. Under the old Common Law the judges would have still had the 
possibility to grant relief under the equitable doctrine. Because the judges were 
robbed of this flexible institute to grant a just result, they were forced to transform 
those cases261-like Conlon- by verbal skill under the Act. 
But Conlon revealed also that the Act failed to achieve the determined goal, which 
was the "the amalgamation of the present fragmented doctrines ... into a single body 
of law dealing with mistake"262 Also in this context the Act was just a half-hearted 
approach. The codification included only aspects of the rescission of contracts and not 
principles of the formation of contracts. So the legislature ignored the fact that 
mistake-related doctrines are found in different areas of the Contract Law. But the 
New Zealand experience with the "codification" does not necessary mean that the 
Common Law countries should leave the mistake of law to the traditional Common 
Law and to Equity. However, this appears to be a better solution than just a "partial 
codification". Nevertheless this traditional approach has its deficits. One big 
disadvantage is that a valid contract in Common Law can still be nullified in Equity. 
Although this gives the courts the advantage of a great flexibility it also causes the big 
disadvantage of uncertainty for the contract-parties. This was also recognised when in 
the UK the Court of appeal abolished the equitable doctrine and Lord Phillips 
258 That was why the equitable doctrine was abolished. 
259 in section 2( 1) 
260 in section 6 
261 (like cases of constructive knowledge or unilateral mistakes) 
262 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on the effect of Mistakes on Contracts 
Department of Justice, Wellington 1976, 10. 
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demanded for a legislative intervention to achieve greater flexibility. Therefore, the 
other arguable way would be a "codification" of the whole contract law and not just 
extracts of it. This codification would have to ease carefully the contradicting aims of 
"flexibility of the courts" which is necessary to achieve a just result and "judicial 
certainty" for the contracting parties. 
At least in some aspects it might be helpful to take a look at the more successful 
codification in Germany. Here the whole contract law was enacted, and not just 
extracts of it. In addition a wider approach like in Equity was enacted. A mistake does 
not nullify a contract but only one party can challenge the contract. 
This has not given rise to judicial uncertainty, because in the Act there are some 
disadvantages for the mistaken party enacted263. With such an enactment the balance 
between judicial certainty and flexibility and justice can be achieved. 
263 
( e.g.: compensation for the party, that relied on the contract) 
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